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Abstract
A BEHAVIORAL AND BIOPSYCHOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ROLE OF THE ILLUSION OF
CONTROL AND PERSEVERATIVE CHASING BETWEEN PROBLEM AND NON-PROBLEM GAMBLERS
By
Brett Bauchner

Advisor: Dr. Michael Lewis, Ph.D.
The illusion of control is associated with problem gambling. The perception that one is in
control of a random event, when in reality there is no control, can facilitate problem gambling
behaviors. The degree or extent of control may activate physiological mechanism of increased
excitation and reward that reinforce gambling. In the studies presented here, performance on
simulated gambling tasks that provided varying levels gambling participation were compared to
physiological measures of behavioral activation in problem gambler and nongamblers.
Participants watched video clips of three horseraces scenarios that permitted different degrees of
participation and control over wagering. Concurrently saliva samples were collected throughout
the experiment. Salivary cortisol levels, a glucocorticoid produced in response to hypothalamicpituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis activation, were increased in problem gamblers in comparison to
nongamblers when they were permitted unrestricted wagering. This study provides evidence that
that gamblers produce higher levels of salivary cortisol than nongamblers, only when the illusion
of control is present within the gambling session. There was no difference between problem
gamblers and nongamblers in cortisol production with wins or losses. No correlation was found
between participants’ ratings of excitability, desirability of control, and production of salivary
cortisol and gambling status.
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In addition, levels of risk-taking and perseverative chasing (chasing after one’s losses)
were measured using the Balloon Analogue Risk Task using a population of gamblers and
nongamblers. Gamblers were found to be both riskier and more likely to chase their losses than
nongamblers. The research reported in this dissertation provides support for the hypothesis that
the illusion of control and perseverative chasing are two important factors that facilitate problem
gambling behavior. Given these findings, treatment strategies for problem gambling may include
methods for addressing these important determinants of the behavior.
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General Introduction
Gambling is an extremely common activity throughout most cultures. The term gambling
refers to placing a wager on a specific game or activity, such as slot machines, dice, cards,
instant lottery tickets, bingo, roulette, sporting events, races, or national lottery drawings
(Shaffer, Hall, & VanderBilt, 1999). The formal definition of gambling refers specifically to
risking something of value on an event that has the potential to result in earning something even
more valuable than the initial item was worth (Boyd, 1976). The overwhelming majority of
people who have gambled have done so in a manner that did not cause them any psychological
distress or any serious financial hardships. However, nearly eleven million Americans will
experience problematic gambling tendencies in their lifetime (Shaffer, Hall, & VanderBilt,
1999).
This dissertation hypothesizes that there are two key factors that contribute to the
manifestation of problem gambling and that these two factors are, to some extent, related to one
another. The first factor is the psychological feeling of being in control of a random event that
some individuals demonstrate while they are in the act of gambling. The other factor is the
inability to stop gambling when losing (termed Perseverative Chasing) and instead, to keep
chasing after the losses in order to recoup some or all of the funds.

Terminology and Prevalence
Throughout this dissertation, I will use specific terminology that refers to various levels
of gamblers and various aspects of the gambling experience. Terminology and nomenclature
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within the gambling literature is fairly constant, and it is important for us to understand and
familiarize ourselves with them. The National Research Council has provided specific
terminology that describes levels of gambling, to indicate the degree of gambling involvement
with related problems. A level 0 gambler refers to an individual who has never gambled in
his/her life. Such individuals have never placed a bet in the hopes of winning more through an
event of chance. Not once in his/her life has this person purchased a lottery ticket, bet on a horse
race, played a casino game, or purchased a raffle ticket (National Research Council, 1999). Level
1 gamblers are typically thought of as social gamblers, meaning their gambling does not result in
any major financial, personal, or social problems in their lives (National Research Council,
1999). The majority of U.S. citizens are classified as level 1 gamblers. Categorization of level 1
is broad, ranging from individuals who spend as little as $5 a year gambling on just one lottery
ticket to people who gamble more frequently, wagering more, assuming there are not any
gambling-related issues that result from their respective behaviors. Level 0 and 1 gamblers are
considered no-risk gamblers because their behaviors do not cause financial or inter-personal
conflict in their lives (National Research Council, 1999).
Level 2 and level 3 gamblers suffer from financial and/or social problems as a result of
their gambling behaviors. Level 2 gambling is often referred to as at-risk gambling with an
increasing frequency, intensity, or amount (National Research Council, 1999). Level 2 gamblers
often accumulate gambling-related debts, ask to borrow money from family and friends, or lie in
order to hide the fact that they are indeed gambling. Level 3 gambling is the most severe form of
gambling and is associated with significant adverse consequences to the gambler, family of the
gambler and employment of the gambler. These individuals meet the DSM-IV criteria for
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pathological gambling (PG), also referred to as problem gambling (PG), compulsive gambling,
or addictive gambling (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). In severe cases, level 3
gamblers will gamble away their entire paycheck, lose their job, jeopardize their marriage, and
commit crimes to support their gambling addiction. A meta-analysis of gambling studies
performed by Shaffer, Hall, and VanderBilt (1999) indicated that 94.7% of the U.S. population
have gambled at least once in their lifetime resulting in no significant problems and should
therefore be considered level 1 gamblers. It was determined that 3.85% (CI: 2.94%- 4.76%) of
the population should be considered level 2 gamblers, and 1.60% (CI: 1.35-1.85%) of the
population should be considered level 3 gamblers, indicating that slightly greater than five
percent of the population or one in every twenty individuals has experienced some form of
problematic gambling in his or her lifetime (Shaffer, Hall, and VanderBilt, 1999).
Although more men than women are considered problem or pathological gamblers (level
2 or 3 gamblers), the basis of this gender difference is unknown. It is also unknown whether
other addictions or mental disorders have implications with the gambling addiction. Ibanez et al.
(2003) found that male gamblers and female gamblers both had similar rates of severity and
similar rates of comorbidity with other psychological disorders. Male problem gamblers had
higher rates of alcohol-related problems in addition to higher rates of antisocial personality
disorder than the female problem gamblers. On the other hand, female problem gamblers had
higher rates of affective disorders and histories of physical mistreatment (Ibanez et al., 2003).
The DSM IV criteria suggest that Compulsive Gambling is an addiction that highlights a
fixation with gambling as well as a desire to wager higher denominations with increasing
frequency, impatience or irritability when attempting to discontinue gambling, "chasing" losses,
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and loss of control by enduring undesirable gambling behaviors, without regard to the disruption
and severe significances of such conduct (Sylvain et al,, 1997). These criteria set by the DSM IV
appear to be heavily supported by the literature in the field. The next section will discuss a main
contributing factor to problem gambling behaviors, the illusion of control.

Illusion of Control
Problem gambling is closely related to the perception that a gambler must control
uncertain of events upon which a wager has been placed. Langer et al. (1975) was among the
first to provide support for the illusion of control in gambling, who defined it as an inflated belief
in one’s skill to predict the outcome of an uncertain event.
The illusion of control is extremely appealing to problem gamblers and is observed under
many circumstances. For example, Langer et al. (1975) showed that college students feel they
have control over winning lottery tickets and Blanco et al. (2011) described students attempting
to cure imaginary patients during a medical decision-making task. Similarly, the illusion of
control is prevalent among athletes, who often have pre-game rituals and superstitions that they
believe will “determine” the outcome of their athletic performance (Bleak & Frederick, 1998).
The issue of perceived control has even become a central to models of pathological
gambling measures (e.g., Frank & Smith, 1989; Rosenthal, 1986). It occurs after just few wins
remaining embedded in the working memory of problem gamblers (Ladouceur, Gaboury,
Dumont, & Rochette, 1988). Perceived knowledge based on previous trials and individualistic
thinking (often based on superstition), facilitate the fallacious thought process that leads the
gambler to feel that he or she is in control of his or her own destiny.
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The illusion of control is a component of impulse control disorder characterized by many
cognitive distortions. Sharpe (2008), for example, suggested that those who suffer from
pathological gambling tendencies bet because they hold irrational or illogical beliefs about the
odds of the game, and feel as though they have the ability to influence the outcome of a random
game or trial. Similarly, Goodie (2003) suggests that pathological gambling is closely related to
the belief that the player have some control over the outcome of a wager.
Strickland, Lewicki, and Katz (1966) noticed increased wagers among casino patrons
when they were permitted to throw the dice themselves as opposed to when other players threw
the dice. Such behavior relates to attribution biases, a concept that implies an overestimation of
controllable forces when explaining results of trials that are pure chance and cannot be
influenced by any external information. With Illusion of control, skill or ability is often used to
account for positive results, whereas environmental factors are typically used to explain negative
outcomes.
Langer and Roth (1975) found that when individuals accurately predict coin flip trials,
they attribute their accuracy to a “skill” that they have developed. Frank and Smith (1989)
confirmed that young children also report that skill or experience is involved in accurately
predicting the outcome of coin tosses. Wagenaar (1988) showed that individuals who win a
series of blackjack hands within one gambling session attribute their wins to skill, whereas
individuals who do not win respond to their losing streaks by suggesting that bad luck rather than
a lack of skill played a central role.
Dixon, Hayes, and Ebbs (1998) gave college students the option of wagering on roulette
by either selecting their own numbers or being assigned numbers by the researchers. The authors
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explained to participants that choosing their own numbers would cost them extra money despite
the fact that the probability of winning remained the same. Surprisingly, participants paid extra
to select their own numbers in approximately half of the trials. Davis, Sundahl, and Lesbo (2000)
observed the gambling patterns of 351 gamblers in Las Vegas casinos and noted that players
place higher wagers when they, themselves, rolled the dice compared with when others rolled the
dice. Letarte, Ladouceur, and Mayrand (1986), assigned roulette players to one of two
conditions, namely frequent or infrequent wins, and found that gamblers in the frequent win
condition illustrate more perception of control than those in the infrequent win condition.
The think-aloud paradigm is an approach used to investigate cognitive illusions that is the
process in which participants verbalize their thoughts while gambling. Participants are asked to
express any thought that may come to mind as they are gambling. College students, make
erroneous attributions to skill for wins and bad luck for losses (Gaboury & Ladouceur, 1989;
Ladouceur, Gaboury, Bujold, LaChance, & Tremblay, 1991).
Orgaz et al. (2013) conducted an experiment that sought to determine whether the illusion
of control was a domain-specific problem or a general issue that affected seemingly unrelated
aspects of daily life. The authors tested a group of pathological gamblers by using a standard
associative learning task that has been shown to be able to illustrate the illusion of control under
specific testing conditions. They found that the level of the illusion of control is higher in
pathological gamblers compared with nongamblers, suggesting that in addition to problems
directly related to gambling, pathological gamblers may be more susceptible to the illusion of
control in other unrelated areas of their daily lives.
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However, there is conflicting evidence as to whether gamblers illustrate a greater amount
of cognitive distortions than nongamblers. Griffiths (1994) found that cognitive distortions, or
irregular thinking, are more commonly seen in gamblers than in nongamblers, whereas Gaboury,
Ladouceur, Beauvais, Marchand, and Martineau (1988) found that all individuals, regardless of
gambling status, have a high degree of cognitive distortions when gambling. These mixed
findings suggest that faulty reasoning and the illusion of control are an inherent part of the
gambling experience. However, few studies have linked the illusion of control to specific
features of casino games. This dissertation attempts bridge this gap by exploring illusion of
control as it relates to an actual of the gambling experience.
Goodie (2003) suggests people tend to be willing to take more risks on aspects that they
are able to control. According to Goodie (2003), control to a gambler fall victim to “probability
alteration,” meaning that those games that a gambler “controls” are characterized by various
actions that he or she can take in order to shift the odds in his or her favor. Games such as the
lottery and bingo allow for zero probability alteration since the numbers are drawn randomly. By
contrast, games such as blackjack and three-card poker allow for minimal probability alteration
since the gambler’s decisions may alter the outcome of the gambling session even though luck
and randomness still dominate the result (Goodie, 2003). Wagers based on skill or knowledge
allow for the greatest fluctuation in probability alteration since the gambler feels as though he or
she has complete control over the outcome (Goodie, 2003). Indeed, it has been shown that
pathological gamblers differ from nongamblers and recreational gamblers in the level of
cognitive processing that underlies their levels of confidence (Goodie, 2003). In other words,
pathological gamblers feel more confident in their wagers than nongamblers and recreational
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gamblers when the outcome relies on probability alteration. It follows that pathological gamblers
show extremely high levels of overconfidence compared with their nonproblem gambler
counterparts and that overconfidence is closely tied to the illusion of control (Goodie, 2003).
Overconfidence is the sensation that occurs when a gambler feels as though he or she is more
likely to win than the real-life odds. The illusion of control contributes to the manifestation of
overconfidence because it has repeatedly been shown that these two factors (overconfidence and
the illusion of control) increase and decrease together (Goodie, 2003). Superstition is also closely
tied to overconfidence and the illusion of control.

Superstitions in Gambling
Superstitions are important cognitive distortions that have been identified as a contributor
to false beliefs, which can have a drastic effect on a seemingly random event (Toneatto, 1999). A
superstition is, in its most simple form, a gesture (verbal or nonverbal) that is believed to
contribute to the outcome of an event when there is no basis in reality for a causal relationship
between the act and result of the trial to exist (Henslin, 1967). The hallmark of a superstition is
the attribution of a cause–effect relationship between performing the ritualistic behavior and an
event occurring or the absence of the ritualistic behavior causing the opposite of the desired
result (Reber, 1985). A common example of a superstition is someone “knocking on wood” to
avoid misfortune or to prevent bad luck from occurring.
Of the approaches researchers use to measure superstition, many scholars once again rely
on the “thinking aloud” method for accumulating data. This is the preferred method of capturing
natural superstition because it enables gamblers to express each thought or idea verbally while
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gambling, typically on a slot machine, without censorship (Griffiths, 1993). These verbalizations
are then tape-recorded, transcribed, and categorized. Other forms of measuring superstition
include behavioral interviews, observations, and conversations (King, 1990). The presence of
“lucky charms” or gambling only in the presence of specific individuals may further reinforce
the notion of the illusion of control.
Joukhador et al. (2004) asked participants to rate, on a five-point Likert scale, statements
related to the strength of their beliefs. Some of these statements included “My hunches have a
big influence on my winning,” “When I’m feeling down I just know that my luck will be bad,”
“I’m superstitious about the way I gamble,” and “I have a ritual which I must carry out when I’m
gambling.” There was a difference between problem and nonproblem gamblers in their
endorsement of the degree to which superstition affects their behavior (Joukhador et al., 2004).
Problem gamblers showed higher ratings of agreement to the superstitious statements mentioned
above compared with nonproblem gamblers. An interesting result of this study, however, was the
absence of a significant difference in superstitious beliefs between men and women, consistent
with the findings of Toneatto et al. (1997).
The strong belief in superstitions in Chinese culture reinforces the notion of the illusion
of control. Chinese superstition is closely tied to gaming since they are highly concerned about
“good” and “bad” numbers, which they believe can influence a person’s future or fortune (Ang,
1997; Pitta, Fung, & Isberg, 1999; Heeler & Nguyen, 2001). For example, the Chinese avoid
betting on the number four since it sounds like the word “death” in Cantonese, and instead bet on
the number eight, which sounds like the word “prosperity” (Bourassa & Peng, 1999). Further
evidence of Chinese superstitious behavior outside the realm of gambling includes an analysis of
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Chinese price advertisements that found that the majority of the prices ended in the number eight
while very few prices ended in the number four (Simmons & Schindler, 2003; Heeler & Nguyen,
2001). Similarly, Chinese living in New Zealand have been shown to overpay, by an average of
5%, for a house that has a lucky number, while there is a direct correlation between house
numbers that include lucky Cantonese numbers and Chinese immigrants that inhabited these
homes (Bourassa & Peng, 1999).
Many Chinese practice feng shui, a centuries-old belief that the surrounding physical
environment should harmonize with an individual (Pye, 1984). Indeed, they often use feng shui
techniques to avoid bad fortune and maximize prosperity. Superstitious Chinese gamblers also
use this technique, which is completely based on intuition, to find a space inside a casino that
offers the best feng shui in order to maximize profits from the gambling session.
In summary, the use of superstition in gambling is closely related to the illusion of
control. Superstitions are typically unique to an individual or culture and they often entail
ritualistic behaviors that, to the gambler, are necessary for a positive outcome. Superstitious
gamblers, in the absence of such superstitious behavior, would feel as though good fortune were
not on their side and that the wager’s outcome would not be favorable. In essence, superstitious
gamblers exemplify the illusion of control through their own behavior, which is usually unrelated
to the outcome of the wager. Superstition may also play a role in the manifestation of gambling
addiction, since superstitious behavior may be self-reinforcing if the gambler is fortunate enough
to subsequently win. The next section will discuss a phenomenon that I argue is closely tied to
the illusion of control, perseverative chasing.
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Perseverative Chasing
It is well established that both pathological gamblers and recreational gamblers often
engage in continued gambling in order to recover from previous losses from within a gambling
session. This behavior, known as loss chasing or perseverative chasing, is tied to impaired
control over gambling behavior and when frequent and uncontrollable, it has the potential to
create financial, social, family, and occupational problems. Perseverative chasing implies a blend
of both positive and negative emotions and motivations. Lesieur (1984), for example, illustrated
that perseverative chasing combines optimistic hope that the forthcoming wager will be
successful and will eliminate, or at least reduce, any session-related losses with an intense fear,
anxiety, and dread that yet another negative outcome will occur, creating an even greater
problem for the gambler to face.
Leiserson and Pihl (2007) found a direct link between perseverative chasing and working
memory deficits. This finding was illustrated by demonstrating the problems problem gamblers
have performing working memory tasks compared with a sample of demographically controlled
counterparts. Given that working memory (relying on past experiences) is critical for mentally
comparing potential risk hazards with reward benefits, Leiserson and Pihl (2007) stated that
pathological or problem gambling is driven by an inaccurate remembrance of positive past
experiences while gambling rather than a realistic memory of remembering negative experiences.
In other words, this is a deficit in general working memory function rather than an extreme
increase in reward-sensitivity dominance compared with asymptomatic gamblers.
In particular, Leiserson and Pihl (2007) focused on analyzing perseverative chasing
behavior in gamblers and nongamblers by delving into working memory functionality. They
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found that problem gamblers show worse memory performance than their control counterparts
on tasks such as the Self-Ordered Pointing Task and Spatial and Non-Spatial Conditional
Association Task. The authors hypothesized that impaired performance on these working
memory tasks was related to perseverative chasing and associated with the poor functioning of
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Leiserson & Pihl, 2007).
Campbell-Meiklejohn et al. (2008) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
in order to determine what types of neural activities are implicated in the complex psychological
behavior of perseverative chasing. By investigating the neural signals associated with
perseverative chasing, or cutting one’s losses by quitting the gambling session, they illustrated
that there is a constant change in the activation of neural systems that represents the conflicting
motivations and attitudes towards perseverative chasing. In particular, perseverative chasing
involves activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the subgenual cingulate cortex, while
the decision to avoid chasing losses and quit the gambling session with milder losses activates
the dorsal anterior cingulate, ventral striatum, and anterior insular cortices. The authors
concluded that perseverative chasing is facilitated by an expectancy of positive outcomes based
on the activation of both the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which has been suggested to be
implicated in positive goal-directed behaviors, and the subgenual cingulate cortex, which is
associated with positive urges and cravings in cocaine-dependent individuals (Breiter et al.,
1997).
The near-miss phenomenon facilitates loss chasing in pathological gamblers. Near-miss
events happen when unsuccessful outcomes are close to a win. Compared with full-misses, nearmisses imply that the gambler is very close to a successful wager, although the wager still results
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in a loss. An example of a near-miss is receiving two “bar” icons on a slot machine payline and
having the third lever just barely miss landing on a central “bar” icon (Clark et al., 2009). It is
suggested that near-miss events are unpleasant to gamblers, yet simultaneously promote
perseverative chasing and enhance the gambler’s motivation to continue gambling (Clark et al.,
2009). Clark et al. (2009), during fMRI research, determined that subjects who demonstrate a
greater level of perseverative chasing after a near-miss event show a greater BOLD response to
near-miss outcomes in the anterior insular and caudolateral orbitofrontal cortices. These same
brain regions are also activated by random wins, suggesting that the brain responds in a similar
fashion to true wins and near-misses, whereby a win is proximal and seems as though it easily
“could have occurred” (Clark et al., 2009). Gamblers may interpret a near-miss as implying that
they are “mastering” a skill that may or may not be involved in the game, which links directly to
the illusion of control (Griffiths, 1993). Although the gambler may not be constantly winning, he
or she feels the sensation of constantly coming close. This mentality facilitates feelings of
overconfidence and the over-attribution of skill (often in games where skill does not play a role),
eventually leading to perseverative chasing. In the next section, research on the gambler’s fallacy
will be presented as well as the relationship between the gambler’s fallacy and the other
gambling factors previously discussed.

Gambler’s Fallacy
The gambler’s fallacy is a psychological paradigm that occurs when previous results
affect an individual’s psychological reasoning over a forthcoming, random event. Lam and
Ozorio (2008) investigated behavioral differences between a group of leisure-casino gamblers
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and non-casino gamblers. In particular, Lam and Ozorio investigated risk taking in leisure-casino
gamblers and nongamblers to analyze the two groups’ reactions to wins and losses. The purpose
of this investigation was to determine whether perceived knowledge of the game and the game’s
odds influence the risk-taking level of the subjects and to identify how confidence would
influence the risk-taking behavior of the subjects (Lam and Ozorio, 2008).
In this design, sixty subjects played a game that was based on an experimental design by
Herrmann and Stewart (1957) in which each subject was given a chance to make twenty betting
wagers. Subjects were asked to choose a desirable number that spanned from 0 to 9, after which
a winning number was randomly drawn. Prior to selecting the desirable number, the participant
was asked to select a betting choice, which was comprised of five viable options of varying
levels of risk and reward (Lam and Orizio, 2008).
These data show that nongamblers select the “safer” option more frequently than
gamblers (Lam and Orizio, 2008). Approximately 82% of all of the decisions made by
nongamblers resulted in the selection of betting choice 1, the safest wager, while less than one
percent of all of the decisions made by nongamblers resulting in the selection of betting choice 5,
the riskiest wager (Lam and Ozorio, 2008). Gamblers more frequently opted for a greater
immediate reward, risked the immediate loss of significant funds and made higher bets than their
nongambling counterparts. Non-gambler subjects took risks more at the beginning of the game
(bet greater than option one), became more risk averse in the middle of the game (bet option
one), and ended the game taking more risks once again. This betting pattern suggests that the
nongamblers were more selective and calculative in their risk-making decisions; on a clinical
level, this may suggest that they showed lower levels of impulsivity than gamblers, which is
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theoretically a major driving force behind pathological gambling tendencies (Steel and
Blaszcynski, 1998).
Another interesting finding of this experiment was that 98.5% of the time, participants
selected a number that was different from the previous round’s winning number. This wagering
pattern reflects the gambler’s fallacy, or the mistaken belief that the probability of a random
event is lowered if that event had previously just occurred, despite the fact that each trial is
independent of the others and has no influence or bearing on the final outcome (Clotfelter and
Cook, 1993). The gambler’s fallacy most likely contributes to the previously mentioned notion
of perseverative chasing.

Theories Related To Etiology of Pathological Gambling
While we cannot attribute a specific “cause” to pathological gambling—one single factor
that causes the manifestation of symptoms, there are several theories that exist that focus on the
etiology of pathological gambling. Again, pathological gambling is characterized by constant,
unrestrained gambling that has the capacity to produce harmful social consequences (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994). The psychological experience of a pathological gambler is often
times different than that of a non-problem gambler or someone who gambles occasionally for the
primary purpose of entertainment. Currently, we are at the early stage of understanding the
causes, origins, evolution, and implications of this disorder. Management is only effective for a
small percentage of the PG population as a result of these preliminary understandings, and it is
expected that treatment options will become more varied as research continues in the field (Grant
et al., 2008; Ledgerwood and Petry, 2006).
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Multiple models have been proposed to explain the development of problem gambling
(Blaszczynski and Nower, 2002). The biopsychosocial model proposed by Sharpe (2002)
suggests that genetic predisposition (e.g. a defective reward mechanism involving alterations in
neurotransmitter release mechanisms) combined with certain personality traits, which also
contain a genetic component, are the driving forces behind the feelings of helplessness that
problem gamblers often feel. Once gamblers begin to use gambling as a mechanism for coping
with stress and optimizing entertainment in their lives, gambling tendencies and behaviors will
become overwhelmingly negative and maladaptive (Sharpe, 2002). Over time, the desire to
gamble and use gambling as a form of entertainment becomes overwhelming. This conceptual
theory on the manifestation of gambling addiction is centered on the utilization of gambling as a
form of stress release. As a result, the need for immediate gambling (impulsivity) weakens the
extent of behavioral self-control and may lead to negative repercussions, such as financial
hardships or interpersonal conflicts. According to the biopsychosocial model, the urge to gamble
is driven by an attempt to lower stress or reduce anxiety. Eventually, a “vicious cycle” is formed
involving urges, anxiety, attempts to cope, the desire for rewards, and gambling. This “vicious
cycle” is further enhanced by “perseverative chasing (PC).”
PC is one of the major factors thought to motivate PG. It is defined as an optimistic
sensation the gambler feels while “chasing” or going after a jackpot or a victory that the problem
gambler feels he/she is “due to hit” or is “bound to occur on the next wager” etc. Leiserson and
Pihl (2007) found a direct link between PC with working memory deficits. This is illustrated by
problems PGs have performing working memory tasks after this sample was matched to
demographically controlled counterparts. Since working memory (relying on past experience) is
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critical to mentally comparing potential risk hazards with reward benefits in any circumstance,
Leiserson and Pihl believe that what is truly driving pathological or problem gambling is an
inaccurate remembrance of positive past experiences while gambling rather than a realistic
memory of remembering some negative experiences while gambling—a deficit in general
working memory function, rather than an extreme increase in reward-sensitivity dominance over
asymptomatic gamblers. As discussed earlier, Leiserson and Pihl focused on analyzing
perseverative chasing behavior in gamblers and nongamblers by delving into working memory
functionality. It was found that problem gamblers showed worse memory performance than their
control counterparts on tasks of learning and memory. The authors hypothesized that impaired
performance on these working memory tasks was related to perseverative chasing and was
associated with suboptimal performance of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Leiserson and Pihl,
2007).

Neurobiology and Neuropharmacology of Gambling Addiction
It is important to understand the neurobiology of gambling addiction and the general
neurocircuitry of reward. In addition, understanding the neuropharmacology may lead to
advanced treatment methods for the disorder.
An underlying system believed to be important in gambling and perhaps the basis of PG
is the “reward system” that is believed to mediate the pleasurable aspects of gambling. These
rewarding experiences in such individuals may be motivationally more significant than the
punishment of losing. Long negative series of gambling sessions (over time) will be temporarily
discounted more than brief positive gambling sessions when the gambler wins. Rachlin (1990)
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hypothesizes that gamblers continue despite sometimes incurring heavy losses, because they fail
to show appropriate levels of self-control because the incentive of potential reward supersedes
any negative expectations of losing (Rachlin, 1990).
Reward is believed to be mediated in the brain by the neurotransmitter dopamine (DA).
DA has been shown to mediate key elements of reward and positive emotion associated with
pleasurable experiences. It is widely believed that this complex neurochemical system produces
feelings of enjoyment and reinforcement and motivates learning. DA is believed to play an
important role in both pleasant and rewarding aspects of gambling and the pathology of PG
(Comings et al., 1996). As with other addictions, it may play a significant role in the progression
from non-PG to the development of PG. Several lines of research suggest that DA and associated
systems mediate incentive motivation mechanisms that reward and motivate compulsive
gambling behavior and lead to the development of habits that are seen as gambling rituals
(Comings et al., 1996).
There are four main dopaminergic pathways: the mesolimbic pathway, the mesocortical
pathway, the nigrostriatal pathway, and the tuberoinfundibular pathway (Kandel, 2000, p. 1009).
The mesolimbic pathway appears to be the primary dopaminergic pathway mediating reward.
The mesolimbic pathway indicates the transmission of DA neurons from the ventral tegmental
area (VTA) in the midbrain to limbic structures such as the nucleus accumbens, amygdala,
hippocampus, and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). DA both excites (via D1 receptors) and
inhibits (via D2 receptors) postsynaptic neurons in a specific cascade of activity that produces
positive emotion and rewards learning. It also plays an important role in the motivation of
ongoing behavior (Kandel, 2000, p. 1012).
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D3 receptors, a subtype of D2 family receptors, inhibit neurons by blocking the
production of the second messenger cAMP and may play a key role in gambling behavior. Le
Pen at al. (2002) suggested that neonatal ventral hippocampal lesions in neonatal rats diminished
reward-seeking behaviors in adulthood that are analogous to certain characteristics of deleterious
symptoms that can be seen in psychotic patients (Le Pen et al., 2002). This study by Le Pen et al.
suggests the utilization and importance of hippocampal activity in the dopaminergic, rewardseeking neural pathway. This also supports Leiserson’s (2007) position that working memory is
heavily involved with the brain mechanisms underlying PG.
D3 receptors have also been implicated in problem gambling (Dodd et al., 2005). Dodd et
al. examined the relationship between treatment of Parkinson’s Disease (PD) and PG. In this
study, eleven patients with both PD and PG were prescribed therapeutic doses of a DA agonist.
DA agonist therapy was associated with reversible PG since there was an unequal amount of D3
receptors being stimulated, primarily in the limbic system (Dodd et al., 2005). This study
provides supports the notion that PD DA replacement therapy may enhance PG tendencies in
those patients, since the same drugs that restore the transmission of DA to treat PG have
implications in the mediation of reward (Dodd et al., 2005).
In addition, cocaine abusers, but not controls, have been shown to establish lower binding
levels of Raclopride (a D2 antagonist) in the thalamus (Volkow, 2004). Since there is an
association between activation of the thalamic response and an increase in drug wanting, and this
observation was seen in drug addicts but not controls, it is suggested that chronic drug use has
led to ‘wanting’ of the drug. Because Raclopride binds to D2 and D3 receptors and since D3
receptors are located in the thalamus in high concentration, it is believed that the thalamic
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response in addicts could represent general upregulation of D3 receptors in addiction (Volkow,
2004).
The relationship of DA mediated reward and activation of peripheral physiological
responses has been shown. In a study that focused on brain imaging and cortisol activation, PET
scans were conducted and plasma cortisol was measured using sixteen healthy adults in a study
by Oswald et al. (2004). The initial PET scan was preceded by IV saline, while the second PET
scan was preceded by IV amphetamine. The study examined the possible relationship of cortisol
with reward-DA function. Oswald et al. found that subjects with higher cortisol level responses
to intravenous ampthemaine also reported positive drug effects as compared to subjects with
lower cortisol responses. More positive responses to drug effects were directly associated with
greater DA release in the left ventral striatum, dorsal putamen, and dorsal caudate. This study
provides support for a relationship between glucocoriticoid levels such as cortisol and
neurological DA activity in humans. These data suggest that individual differences in HPA axis
response functionality may have interact with reward dependencies in humans, such as drug,
alcohol, or gambling addiction (Oswald et al., 2004).
Mannelli et al. (1982) examined the relationship of epinephrine, norepinephrine, DA, and
cortisol when samples were drawn from the brachial and adrenal vein of twelve kidney disease
patients. Of particular importance to this dissertation, it was shown that DA levels were 27 times
higher in the adrenal venous blood as compared to the peripheral blood, and that cortisol was
likewise 23 times higher in the adrenal blood than the peripheral blood (Manelli, 1982). Thus, it
appears that DA and cortisol levels rise and fall similarly (Mannelli, 1982).
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When an individual engages in a mentally or physically arousing behavior, the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis is activated, releasing neuropeptides from the
hypothalamus and pituitary gland, and adrenals produce cortisol, a glucocorticoid. The cortisol
has a wide range of physiological effects on the body, playing a role in metabolism, regulation of
the immune system, as well as implications for the cardiovascular system and overall cognitive
processes (Kudielka and Kirschbaum, 2005). It is hypothesized that recreational gamblers show
increased levels of cortisol when they are gambling, but that pathological or problem gamblers
actually show the opposite or no effect—a decrease in the production of cortisol or at the very
least no change in the production of cortisol. However, when the illusion of control is present
within the gambling session, it is hypothesized that gamblers will show an increase in cortisol
production because the illusion of control serves the role of stressor that facilitates the activation
of the HPA-axis. This hypothesized decreased response in gambling absent of illusion of control
is analogous to the observed HPA response among alcoholics and cocaine users in that the initial
exposure to the drug causes an increase in HPA response, but prolonged exposure shows a
diminished activation of the HPA response (Dai et al., 2007). Piazza et al. (1996) showed that the
administration of glucocorticoids is rewarding in rats. The administration of glucocorticoids in
people is linked to cravings of cocaine (Elman et al., 2003). More detailed discussion of cortisol
and the HPA axis will appear in the following section of this dissertation.

HPA Axis
The HPA axis is important in the production of the stress response. This system regulates
levels of the glucocorticoid and cortisol, as well as other important stress related hormones. Any
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acute stressor that lasts longer than a few minutes will produce a surge of cortisol from the
adrenal cortex, located along the perimeter of the adrenal glands, above the kidneys. A stressor is
defined as any environmental challenge that disturbs the homeostatic balance of the organism,
regardless of whether the disturbance has direct physical, psychological, or emotional
implications (Sapolsky, 1992). A stressor may also disrupt the homeostatic balance cuing of a
impending aversive stimulus as with anticipation of an adverse event. This release of cortisol is
controlled by the paraventricular nucleus (PVN), of the hypothalamus. In response to stressors,
the PVN releases corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH) into the venous distribution to the
pituitary gland where the cells in the anterior pituitary release adrenocorticotrophic hormone
(ACTH) into circulation. ACTH causes the release of cortisol from the adrenal cortex (Sapolsky,
1992). Feedback from the circulating cortisol will eventually inhibit CRH secretion from the
PVN, terminating the HPA response.
During a stressful event, the sympathetic nervous system is also activated. Neural control
of body functions is typically divided into voluntary and involuntary control. Voluntary control
allows the utilization of intentional muscle movements such as moving body parts for specific
functions (raising one’s hand). Involuntary control is mediated by two components of the
autonomic nervous system, the parasympathetic nervous system and the sympathetic nervous
system. The parasympathetic nervous system facilitates actions such as digestion and breathing,
while the sympathetic nervous system is activated by arousal or alarm. The sympathetic nervous
system relays information originating in the spinal cord and terminating in the adrenal medulla
where epinephrine is secreted extremely rapidly. In addition to the production of epinephrine,
norephinephrine (collectively known as the compounds of catecholamines) is also released by
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the adrenal medulla. These changes in production of glucocorticoids such as cortisol and
catecholamines are what undermine the stress response (Sapolsky, 1992).
Gambling is considered a stressor for many reasons. Firstly, the anticipation of winning
and the possibility of losing has repeatedly been shown to alter neuroendocrine function, heart
rate, and emotional status (Paris et al., 2010). In addition to the immediate gratification of a win
or immediate dissatisfaction with a loss, gamblers have the potential to dream of long-term
success in gambling and ruminate over long-term failure in gambling, which may result in
significant loss. Thus, gambling behavior is a strong stressor because it provides the individual
with both immediate reward and punishment, as long as the potential for anticipation of longterm success or failure, which will have realistic implications on their lifestyle. The following
section will discuss psychological variables that contribute to the stress-response, which are
potentially important promoters for the manifestation of problem gambling.

Psychological Factors That Contribute To Stress-Response
Lack of control and lack of predictability are the two factors that contribute to the stressresponse. Weiss (1972) found that rats that had control over shock intensity showed lower
glucocorticoid levels and greater incidence of stomach ulcers than yoked controls. Weiss has also
shown that anticipation of a stressor can cause the elevation in glucocorticoid secretions rather
than the stressor itself (Weiss, 1972). Rats that are conditioned to expect a shock will show an
elevation in glucocorticoid secretion, even if no shock is administered (Weiss, 1972).
Predictability, which is closely related to control is the second factor that contributes to
the stress response. Weiss has showed that if rats are provided with a signal that represents the
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forthcoming shock, these rats actually secrete less glucocorticoids than rats given the same
shocks without any warning of the forthcoming administration of shock (Weiss, 1972). One
commonality between lack of control and lack of predictability is the lack of an outcome with
concrete expectations. Therefore, novel environments or contextual situations are amenable to
activating the stress-response and are directly related to lack of predictability. This activation of
the stress response may be attributed to a lack of previous experience or predictable patterns that
one has the ability to rely upon. Chatterton et al. (1997) showed a substantial increase in cortisol
among men learning to parachute jump for the very first time. However, after the initial jump,
the stress response became attenuated as the novelty of the situation lessened and lessened,
although the dangers and risks associated with parachute jumping remained essentially the same
(Chatterton, 1997).
The role of the HPA axis and more specifically the secretion of cortisol in conjunction
with alcoholism was studied by King and colleagues (2006). Two groups of social drinkers
participated in this stud: heavy drinkers and light social drinkers. Each drinker provided saliva
samples after zero drinks, two drinks (.4 g/kg of alcohol), and four drinks (.8g/kg of alcohol).
Saliva samples were taken 15, 45, 105, and 165 minutes after beverage consumption so that a
dose response curve was formed. A significant group x dose x time interaction was found and
four drinks (.8 g/kg alcohol) produced an attenuated cortisol response in heavy drinkers
compared to light drinkers, when the blood alcohol content was lower. This finding suggests that
a high dose of alcohol produces a small increase salivary cortisol in heavy drinkers as compared
to light, social drinkers. The reduced cortisol release in heavy drinkers could be explained by a
tolerance effect—meaning that social drinkers psychologically consider four drinks to put them
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in a “novel context,” a situation they do not frequently encounter, while heavy drinkers have
been habituated to the same amount of alcohol consumption (King, 2006).
Psychological stress has been shown to be involved with increasing activity of the HPA
axis. Situations that feature low levels of predictability and low levels of controllability and
novelty yield increased production of CRH and ACTH, and cortisol. Sadi et al. (2013) showed an
increase in salivary cortisol production in anxious dental patients as compared to non-anxious
subjects (control group). Kanegane et al. (2009) supported the idea that dental patients who
experienced pain in their dental procedures showed elevated levels of salivary cortisol as
compared to patients who did not experience any pain.
A study by Van Eck and colleagues (1996) provided evidence that negative affect
towards one’s job was correlated with an elevated cortisol response and that the largest
predictors of high cortisol levels were agitation and negative affect. Two groups of male white
collar workers participated in a study that investigated the relationship between job-related stress
and salivary cortisol production (Van Eck et al., 1996). The first group in this study was
considered the “high-stress” group based on self-report measures, and the second group in the
study was considered the “low-stress” group based on the same self-report measures. Examples
of the measures included the Perceived Stress questionnaire which measures stress level on the
job in the last month and the Life Events questionnaire which recorded major life events in the
past year such as divorce or death of a family member. Salivary cortisol was taken from the
participants in this study while they were completing the questionnaires by holding a cotton roll
in their mouths for duration of one minute.
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Use of Salivary Cortisol as a Biomarker
Salivary cortisol measurement is a valuable tool in determining the activation of the HPA
axis. The procedure is often used in biopsychological research since it is noninvasive, and it can
be measured at any time of the day or night and under a wide spectrum of clinical settings. Since
salivary cortisol is often utilized to measure HPA activation in response to a stressor, measuring
cortisol through saliva is often a better option than measuring plasma cortisol or cortisol found in
urine due to the fact that the salivary collection method itself is less stressful than providing a
blood or a urine sample. The procedure of collecting cortisol from blood or urine is often a
stressor in and of itself that may alter the reliability of the data.
Since cortisol enters the saliva by passive diffusion, levels that are attained from a saliva
sample are not sensitive to the flow rate of the saliva. Because acinar cells that line the saliva
glands block large protein-bound molecules, such as bound cortisol, from entering the saliva, the
unbound cortisol is what is being measured from saliva samples; this unbound cortisol is the
target cortisol of interest since the unbound cortisol contributes to glucocorticoid effects
(Mendel, 1989).
Convenience of sampling is the major advantage of salivary cortisol testing. Saliva
samples may be easily gathered from individuals of all ages due to the noninvasive means of
collection. A sample volume may vary from 0.05 to 2.00 mL. There is some caution in collecting
samples. First, salivary cortisol should not be gathered until thirty minutes after eating or
smoking, as saliva samples can be affected by food and/or drugs. Discoloration or blood-tainted
saliva should be discarded and should not be used in analyses. Secondly, certain medications,
specifically SSRIs and medications that are prescribed for Cushing’s syndrome, can impair
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laboratory assessment of HPA axis activity. Salivary cortisol is a dependable indicator of free
cortisol in plasma, indicating that blood levels of cortisol typically rise and fall with salivary
levels. Cortisol increases within minutes in response to acute stressors and salivary cortisol
appears to have a half-life of approximately one hour (Sapolsky, 1993).

Gambling Studies (without the illusion of control) that use Cortisol as a Biomarker
The first study to use salivary cortisol as a biomarker to measure the activation of the
HPA axis in gamblers was conducted by Meyer et al. (2000). Ten male gamblers participated in
both an experimental session (playing blackjack in a casino using their own money) and a
control condition (playing blackjack for points rather than money with nothing to lose). Based on
increased heart rates and levels of salivary cortisol, the authors concluded that gambling in a
“real-life” setting activates the HPA axis and increases cardiovascular activity compared with
gambling for fun in a controlled environment with no money to gain or lose. These effects
facilitate the manifestation of gambling addiction.
Paris et al. (2010) also used salivary cortisol testing among recreational and pathological
gamblers, who were asked to watch videoclips of their preferred mode of gambling and of a
neutral stimulus (in this paradigm, a rollercoaster ride). Saliva samples for cortisol analysis were
taken both before and after the presentation of each videoclip. The authors found that the base
levels of salivary cortisol did not reach statistical significance for either group. However,
recreational gamblers showed higher levels of salivary cortisol after both the gambling and the
rollercoaster videoclips had been shown, while pathological gamblers did not. They also found
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that women displayed a nonsignificant increase in their salivary cortisol response compared with
men when they were shown both videos. This study thus provided insights into the fact that (i)
pathological gamblers may show a diminished response to the HPA axis compared with
recreational gamblers during gambling stimuli and that (ii) gender may play a role in this
paradigm (Paris et al., 2010).

Diurnal Changes of Salivary Cortisol
Levels of salivary cortisol vary during the 24 hour day cycle. This diurnal variation in
cortisol is mediated by an ACTH-dependent circadian rhythm that peaks at the early hours in the
morning and gradually decreases during the late hours of the night. Circadian rhythm, and
awakening at the end of a nocturnal sleep cycle is regulated by the hypothalamic suprachiasmatic
nucleus. Nocturnal sleep studies reveal that ACTH and cortisol levels are at their lowest levels
during stage 3 and 4 sleep, and that these levels rise during REM sleep, which typically occurs at
the end of the night’s sleep, proximal to the time that we arise (Born and Fehm, 1998). Elevated
cortisol levels during the final cycles of REM sleep may activate spontaneous waking up. (Born
and Fehm, 1998).
Awakening induces activation of the HPA axis. Levels of both ACTH and cortisol
increase (Pruessner et al., 1997). Salivary cortisol increases within the first thirty minutes of
awakening, and the levels remain fairly stable (Pruessner et al., 1997). This increase is not
sensitive to age, alcohol consumption from the previous night, duration of sleep, smoking, or
awakening time (Edwards et al., 2001).
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Figure 1. The response to awakening and the diurnal cycle of cortisol. Means and standard
error scores are indicated (Edwards et al., 2001). Data are presented for two groups, Early
Awakeners and Late Awakeners.

Figure 1 shows that both early and late awakening increase in free cortisol levels within
the first thirty minutes of arising. There is a sharp decrease in free cortisol concentration between
one and three hours after the individual has woken and a more gradual decline for the remainder
of the day.
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Figure 2. The response to consumption of food and the diurnal cycle of plasma cortisol
(mg/dL) (Wilson et al., 2001). Data are presented as means throughout the 24-hour day.

Figure 2 above (Wilson, 2001) shows the general relationship of cortisol levels to time
periods during the day. Cortisol appears to be at the highest concentrations at 08:00 and the
lowest levels during the first half of the individual’s sleep cycle from approximately 12:00
midnight - 04:00 AM. Increased levels of cortisol are often associated with hunger. Once an
individual consumes a meal or a snack, levels of cortisol will begin to change. High protein diets
in particular are responsible for increasing levels of salivary cortisol. Gibson et al. (1999) found
that salivary cortisol increased after a protein-rich meal. This increase starts approximately thirty
minutes post-meal, and peaks approximately one hour after the start of that meal. Foods with a
high glycemic index increase, while foods containing a low glycemic index cause cortisol levels
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to decrease (Gibson, 1999). In light of this research, participants in the proposed study will be
instructed not to eat any food two hours prior to testing so that food is not a confounding variable
that may interfere with accurate and reliable data.

Medications That Affect Cortisol
Certain medications alter cortisol levels and are of concern to the proposed research.
Individuals that are using or who have used drugs in the previous seven days will be excluded.
The following discussion highlights the specific pharmaceuticals that are known to alter
glucocorticoid production.
By employing classifications of medication based on function or disruption to the HPA
axis, we may evaluate which medications may have a pharmacologic mechanism involving
salivary cortisol, and be able to identify specific medications that affect the production of the
glucocorticoid. This section is of importance to my proposed study because I will control for the
effects that these medications have on salivary cortisol by excluding any participant who is
currently taking drugs that may alter the production of cortisol.
The first type of medication that we will discuss is medication that influences the
individualistic experience of identifying stress, emotion, novelty, or threat. Research supports the
notion that activation of the HPA axis is less based on objective features of a stimulus (such as
intensity or frequency) and more based on the subjective experience that the individual
encounters (Levine and Ursin, 1991). It is therefore logical that pain medications, narcotics,
depressants, stimulants, anti-depressants, and anxiolytics may influence flow rate and production
of salivary cortisol since these medications can alter the subjectivity of the individual’s
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experience with a stimulus, despite the fact that the objectivity of the stimulus would remain
constant (Granger et al., 2009). These medications alter the subjective experience the individual
encounters.
Another type of medication that can affect salivary cortisol is any medication that has
agonistic or antagonistic effects within the HPA Axis. Any medication that affects CRH,
oxytocin, vasopressin, and catecholamines has the potential to affect salivary cortisol (Granger et
al., 2009). For this reason, corticosteroids, which are commonly found in anti-inflammatory
medications, can alter levels of salivary cortisol.
Other medications that can affect or interfere with production of salivary cortisol are
medications with the propensity to influence levels of LDL (low density lipoproteins), such as
common cholesterol reduction medications like Lipitor and Crestor (Granger et al., 2009). In
addition, any hormone replacement therapy, such as birth control pills or estrogen supplements,
may potentially increase cortisol, and participants taking these medications should be excluded
from research that involves salivary cortisol testing. Any medication that has the potential to
influence salivary composition and availability by affecting the activity of the sympathetic
nervous system, parasympathetic nervous system, or biological pathway leading to cortisol
synthesis, may affect levels of salivary cortisol during research testing (Granger et al., 2009). A
list of common medications that frequently alter levels of salivary cortisol include: SSRIs
utilized as antidepressants (Lexapro), steroids for anti-inflammatory properties (Prednisone),
benzodiazepines for anxiety (Xanax), hypolipidemic statins for high cholesterol (Lipitor),
progesterone for contraception (Nor-QD), cholinergic medications used to treat myasthenia
gravis or glaucoma (Duvoid for MG), anti-cholinergic medications used to treat overactive
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bladder, irritable bowel syndrome, or asthma (Flavoxate, for IBS) (Granger et al., 2009). The
table below summarizes the information that has been contained in this discussion of
medications that commonly alter production of salivary cortisol.

Table 1. Types of Medication That Alter Production of Salivary Cortisol (Granger et al., 2009)
Medication Class

Example

SSRI

Fluoxetine (Prozac)

Tricyclic anti-depressant

Selegiline (Eldepryl)

Antipsychotic

Chlorpromazine (Thorazin)

Pain- Narcotic

Codeine

Pain- Non-narcotic

Acetaminophen (Tylenol)

Corticosteroids- Oral

Betamethasone (Diprosone)

Corticosteroids- Nasal

Flunisolide (AeroBid)

Cholesterol- Hypolipidemic Statins

Lipitor

Cholesterol- Niacin Fibrates

Niacin

Progesterone

Nor-QD

Estrogen Replacement Therapy

Cenestin

Contraceptive- oral

Loestrin 1/20

Contraceptive- Transdermal patch

Ortho Evra patch

Contraceptive- Vaginal Ring

Nuva Ring
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The following Specific Aims refer to my study that investigated the role of the illusion of control
in conjunction with salivary cortisol production.

Specific Aims:
Aim 1: To investigate the production of cortisol for gamblers and nongamblers in conjunction
with three different paradigms: Simple Exposure, Assigned Horse, and Flexible Choice Horse
outlined in the methods below. My working hypothesis is that nongamblers will show higher
levels of salivary cortisol production than gamblers among all three paradigms and that
gamblers will show the highest level of salivary cortisol for the Flexible Choice condition,
whereby they have control over their own wager.

Aim 2: To investigate the production of cortisol in response to a winning and a losing “bet,” and
to determine if there are differences in ratings of excitability and of the gambling experience
between gamblers and nongamblers. My working hypothesis is that both gamblers and
nongamblers will show a higher level of salivary of cortisol in response to a win as compared
with a loss.

Aim 3. To determine if there are differences in the gamblers and nongamblers subjective ratings
of excitability and to determine whether these ratings are related to production of salivary
cortisol. My working hypothesis is that gamblers will show higher levels of subjective ratings of
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excitability than nongamblers and that these ratings will be related to the production of salivary
cortisol.

Methods

Participants
Sixty-three college students from Hunter College, CUNY, were recruited and, upon the
completion of the experiment, were granted credits toward their mandatory participation in
active research (mandated by Hunter College). Forty-two of these participants were recreational
gamblers or non-problem gamblers, who had never suffered from problem gambling in their
lifetime, and 21 were problem gamblers, who met the criteria for problem or pathological
gambling as defined by the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) or Lie/Bet scale. Non-problem
gamblers will be referred to as nongamblers in this paper. All participants were at least 18 years
old, and none were taking medication to treat any underlying psychological disorders or that
could affect the production of salivary cortisol. Demographic data were collected in order to
minimize the confounding variables, and these data indicated that there were no significant
differences between the two groups.
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Materials
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS)
The most commonly used tool for diagnosing problem gambling is the South Oaks
Gambling Screen (SOGS) (Lesieur & Blume, 1987). This 20-item questionnaire asks “yes or no”
questions, with the responses that the individual provides allowing a categorization of “level 1
gambler,” “level 2 gambler,” and “level 3 gambler.” These categorizations represent a no-risk
gambler, low-risk gambler, and high-risk gambler, respectively (Lesieur & Blume, 1987).
Typically, individuals that respond affirmatively to zero questions or one question on the
questionnaire are considered to be no-risk gamblers, individuals that respond affirmatively to
two, three, or four questions are considered to be low-risk gamblers, and individuals that respond
affirmatively to five questions or more are considered to be “probable pathological” gamblers
(Lesieur & Blume, 1987). Lesieur and Blume (1987), the creators of the SOGS, validated their
questionnaire by attesting to the fact that 97% of pathological gamblers that were enrolled in
Gamblers Anonymous did indeed respond positively to five or more of the questions provided on
the SOGS. Some examples of items that appear on the SOGS include “Have you ever felt like
you would like to stop gambling but didn’t think you could?” and “Have you ever borrowed
from someone and not paid them back as a result of your gambling?” (Lesieur & Blume, 1987).

Lie/Bet Scale
The lie/bet questionnaire is a simple yet direct means of assessing problem gambling.
This questionnaire is extremely brief; it consists of only two distinct items, namely “Have you
ever had to lie to people important to you about how much you gambled?” and “Have you ever
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felt the need to bet more and more money?” (Johnson et al., 1997). According to Johnson et al.
(1997), these two items focus on the two main effects of pathological gambling, namely (i)
dishonesty with loved ones to mask the negative effects of gambling and
impulsivity/perseverative chasing and (ii) being unable to restrict the urge to maintain a constant
wager while gambling in order to chase a loss or because the thrill of the gamble dissipates
unless the wager grows larger over time. A positive response to either or both of these items has
been shown to be highly correlated with an accurate classification of problem or pathological
gambling, with rates as high as 99% in a study that measured the validity of the brief survey,
once again utilizing individuals enrolled in the Gamblers Anonymous program (Johnson, Hamer,
& Nora, 1998).

Desirability of Control Questionnaire
Although wanting to be in control is somewhat of a universal desire, it is assumed that
people vary in the strength of this necessity. Some individuals may have strong tendencies to
attempt to control aspects of their lives, while others may show a weaker urge to attempt to
regulate their surroundings (Gebhardt & Brosschot, 2002). The Desirability of Control scale
assesses the general desire for control in one’s life. The scale uses 20 items that measure aspects
of control with regards to decision making, taking preventative measures to make sure situations
do not get out of hand, avoidance of situations where control is theoretically impossible, and the
desire to control and manipulate others’ behaviors and intentions (Burger & Cooper, 1979). This
measure has been used in previous gambling studies, which have determined that desire for
control scores tend to be related to the amount of money that problem gamblers enrolled in
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Gamblers Anonymous had lost during their most detrimental year of gambling (Burger & Smith,
1985). The Desirability of Control scale is a reliable and valid testing instrument that has yielded
consistent results in a variety of settings. Although the test itself is reliable and valid, however, it
has repeatedly been shown that scores vary somewhat based on demographics. Women have
consistently shown a lower desire for control than men (Burger & Solano, 1994), and although
general control is unrelated to age, certain items on the questionnaire are age-specific (e.g.
health-related desires for control are lower within older age groups compared with younger age
groups). In addition, it has been determined that those with a higher education level are more
likely to show high desire for control (Smith et al., 1984).

Salivary Cortisol
Saliva was collected using Salimetrics Oral Swabs (Salimetrics, LLC, State College, PA)
based on the instructions from the manufacturer. Seven saliva samples were collected from each
participant, stored at a temperature of -20 degrees Celsius, and later analyzed by using cortisol
enzyme immunoassay kits (Salimetrics, LLC, State College, PA).
Samples were stored at −20 °C at Hunter College until later analysis via commerciallyavailable cortisol enzyme immunoassay kits at Salimetrics, LLC (Salimetrics, LLC, State
College, PA). Samples were thawed on ice and centrifuged at 1500 × g for 15 min. Samples were
visually inspected for the presence of blood (none were found) and then a pipette was used to
displace samples into microliter plates pre-coated with antibodies to cortisol bound to
horseradish peroxidase (Paris et al., 2010). Because abnormal sample pH can negatively affect
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ELISA efficiency, sample pH was detected using a colorimetric reaction within wells
(Salimetrics, LLC, State College, PA). Normal range was detected for all samples.
Tetramethylbenzidine was added to each well and optical density (450 nm) was determined
using an ELX800 universal microplate plate reader (BioTek Instruments, Inc., Winooski, VT).
All samples were analyzed in duplicate to ensure accuracy of testing and the average of the two
cortisol levels were used in all future analyses (Paris et al., 2010).

Procedure
All collection took place between 10:00AM and 12:00 PM in order to minimize diurnal
variations of cortisol as a confounding variable. After demographic data on participants had been
collected (including a note of current medications) and participants had completed the SOGS,
Lie/Bet, and Desirability of Control questionnaires, a baseline sample of saliva was collected.
The entire study was conducted in a 12 ft. × 12 ft. experimental cubicle including a desk
supporting an Apple computer, a 13-inch color monitor, and a mouse. The experimenters were
seated in a cubicle next to the participant, but out of the participant’s sight. Participants then
watched three videoclips with full audio that were approximately four minutes in duration. Each
videoclip showed a different horserace, during which the participant had varied levels of control
over their wagered outcome of the race and each video clip was shown 20 minutes apart, during
which the participant rested and listened to relaxing music in the interim. Each horserace
contained the same number of horses and pilot data suggested that the races were similar in terms
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of excitability. The number of furlongs separating the first place and second place horses was the
same in each video, and none of the races featured a winner that came from behind to win the
race. Each race that was shown was obtained from the New York Racing Association and each
of the three races was held at Belmont Park in Elmont, New York. Classification of gambler was
given to the participant if they scored >4 on the SOGS or answered affirmatively to either of the
two items on the Lie/Bet Scale.
During the first race (EXPOSURE), participants were simply told to watch the video of
the horserace, and at the end of the race, their excitement level was measured using a Likert scale
(1–5), whereby 1 indicated that the clip was “not at all exciting” and 5 indicated that the clip was
“extremely exciting.” Immediately following the viewing of the videoclip and Likert scale
ratings, a sample of saliva was collected from the participant by a trained research assistant. An
additional saliva sample was taken 10 minutes after the video presentation (EXPOSURE + 10).
During the second race (ASSIGNED), participants were assigned a specific horse to root
for and were told that if their horse won the race, then they would be entered into a raffle for the
chance to win a $50 Amazon gift certificate. In this paradigm, there was an incentive for
participants to cheer for a specific horse; however, they did not have the flexibility to choose
their own horse. Half of participants were intentionally assigned the winning horse, while the
other half were assigned a losing horse. Immediately following the race, participants were asked
to complete the same Likert scale as above and an additional saliva sample was again taken 10
minutes after the video presentation (ASSIGNED + 10).
During the third race (FLEXIBLE), participants were given complete flexibility to
choose whichever horse they wanted. Each participant was provided with the number and color
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representing the horse’s number. Once again, participants were told that if their horse wins the
race, then they would be entered into a raffle for the chance to win a $50 Amazon gift certificate.
Immediately following the race, participants were again asked to complete the same Likert scale
and an additional saliva sample was taken 10 minutes after the video presentation.
The order of videoclips was counterbalanced across subjects and conditions such that it
would not account for any variations in cortisol levels. Participants were given a five-minute
resting period after the +10 minutes salivary cortisol collection, meaning that each participant
had 15 minutes during which they were instructed to relax and were not provided with any active
instructions from a research assistant. In total, each participant produced seven saliva samples
(baseline sample before any presentation of videos and two samples per video paradigm).
Participants were debriefed and compensated with the granting of three credits toward
the research requirement mandated by Hunter College, CUNY. All measures were taken between
10 am and midday, so that cortisol variation based on circadian rhythms was not a confounding
variable. Participants were instructed not to consume any food one hour prior to the start of the
experiment. All participants were healthy and not currently taking any prescription medication
that may affect salivary cortisol production or the rate of flow, as outlined in the section below
that details the medication that may affect salivary cortisol.
Data Analysis
In addition to descriptive statistics, paired-samples t-tests were conducted to examine
differences in scores by condition, while independent-samples t-tests were conducted to examine
differences in several measures of interest by gambler status and win/loss. Additionally,
correlations were conducted with the desirability of control scale as well as excitability ratings.
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Additionally, a General Linear Model was conducted, with the outcome of interest in this
analysis consisting of respondent cortisol levels.

Results
Cortisol levels decreased in all subjects over the testing in comparison to baseline (Figure
3). Gamblers exhibited this effect with each condition (Figure 4) while nongamblers showed
decreases between the baseline condition and the exposure condition, and the assigned and
assigned + 10mins condition (Figure 5).

Figure 3. Mean cortisol levels (ug/dL) for entire sample of respondents. Data are presented for
baseline as well as each of three conditions: exposure, assigned, and flexible. Data also reflect
additional sample taken 10 minutes after each of the three conditions.
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Figure 4. Mean cortisol levels (ug/dL) for nongamblers. Data are presented for baseline as well
as each of three conditions: exposure, assigned, and flexible. Data also reflect additional sample
taken 10 minutes after each of the three conditions.
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Figure 5. Mean cortisol levels (ug/dL) for gamblers. Data are presented for baseline as well as
each of three conditions: exposure, assigned, and flexible. Data also reflect additional sample
taken 10 minutes after each of the three conditions.

45
As shown in Figure 6, gamblers were found to have an increased cortisol mean as
compared with nongamblers for the Flexible+10mins measurement, t(25.023) = -2.265, p<.05.
Additionally, gamblers were found to have an increased cortisol mean as compared with
nongamblers for the Flexible measurement, t(26.108), p<0.10 that trends towards significance.
There were no differences in cortisol means between gamblers and nongamblers for any of the
other conditions.
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Figure 6. Difference in Mean Salivary Cortisol Production (ug/dL) and Condition. Data are
presented for each of three conditions: exposure, assigned, and flexible. Data also reflect
additional sample taken 10 minutes after each of the three conditions (* indicates p<.05, **
indicates p<.10)

47

There were no differences in salivary cortisol production between gamblers and
nongamblers found in their response to a win or a loss during the Assigned or Flexible condition.
T-tests (found in Appendix 1) indicated no difference on the basis of whether the respondent was
assigned or had chosen the winning or losing horse.
Spearman’s correlations were conducted between the adjusted sum of the desirability of
control scale and each of the seven cortisol response measurements. For these analyses and all
further analyses incorporating the desirability of control scale, the sum of the scale was adjusted
to account for any missing data respondents may have had. While very strong, positive
correlations existed between the cortisol measurements themselves, none of the correlations
conducted between the desirability of control scale and the seven cortisol measurements were
found to be significant. These data do not support the expected association between this scale
and the cortisol response. A series of Spearman’s correlations were also conducted between the
cortisol measurements and the Exposure, Assigned, and Flexible excitability rankings and no
significant correlations were found.
The relationship of time, time/gambler status, condition, condition/gambler status, and
time/condition/gambler status was examined using the GLM. This GLM included the set of
seven cortisol measurements as outcomes, although it only included gamblers status as a factor
and did include covariates. Changes in cortisol measurements between the initial and
time+10mins measurements were significant, F(1,56)=6.295, p<.05. Differences were also found
for the effect of condition, indicating significant mean differences in cortisol on the basis of
experimental condition, F(3,56) = 6.756, p<.001. With regard to time, mean cortisol levels were
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found to decrease from the initial measurements to the +10 minutes measurements. With regard
to condition, the baseline mean cortisol measurements was found to be higher than the exposure
and assigned conditions, but not the flexible condition. No other pairwise comparisons were
indicated.
The interaction between condition and gambler status was also found F(3,56) = 4.3873,
p<.01. An examination of the mean scores found similar scores with respect to the exposure and
assigned conditions across gambler status, though regarding the flexible condition, gamblers
were found to have much higher cortisol levels than nongamblers both initially and in the +10
minutes measurement. Tables representing these analyses may be found in the Appendix 1.

Discussion
Overall, several significant results were found in these analyses. The paired-samples ttests were generally found to be significant, indicating significant differences in cortisol
measurements between baseline and the remaining conditions. A significant difference was
found with respect to differences between gamblers and nongamblers in cortisol levels associated
with the Flexible condition, while several significant results were indicated in the GLM, which
consisted of a significant effect of time, condition, and interaction between condition and
gambler status on cortisol levels.
The difference between gamblers and nongamblers for the Flexible and Flexible + 10
minutes conditions, but not for the other conditions, suggests that the illusion of control plays an
important role in HPA axis activation for problem gamblers. Indeed, the illusion of control may
underlie the elevated levels of salivary cortisol in gamblers, which suggests that they are
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stimulated and excited in scenarios where they are in control of their own wager. This finding
supported the working hypothesis that was associated with this specific aim of the study.
Contrary to my working hypothesis of Aim 2, there was no significant difference in
salivary cortisol levels between gamblers and nongamblers with respect to the selection of a
winning or losing horse. This was an unexpected finding, as it was expected that a winning
selection would facilitate an increase in salivary cortisol for both groups (Franco et al., 2011).
One logical explanation for this finding was that the entry to a raffle for a gift certificate was not
enough of an incentive for gamblers to become excited when they won. I hypothesize that if this
experiment took place in a casino or racetrack with true potential payouts and losses, as opposed
to a laboratory environment, this effect would have been seen.
The elevated baseline salivary cortisol measurement among all participants suggests that
all participants were aroused by the task, more than expected and this may have made it difficult
to observe expected effects. These may the result of factors that were incidentally part of the
experimental design. These factors included the anticipation of the gambling experiment as well
as the general stress or anxiety related to promptly attending the session or signing the consent
form.
Another limitation is that while this study is contributing to the literature in problem
gambling, the paradigm was experimental by nature and while participants did have incentive to
gain monetary value, they did not have any risk of losing anything of monetary value. The results
of this study should be interpreted with this in mind, as it has been shown that cortisol levels and
heart rates in gambling studies are more accurate in true gambling venues such as casinos, when
players are risking their own money (Anderson & Brown, 2011). It may be true that there was
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not enough of a reward stimulus present in the experimental design to excite and stimulate all
participants to their maximum potential.
In addition it has been shown that anticipation of an experience in the near future (next
hour) is positively correlated with increased cortisol levels (Smyth et al., 1998). Shannon et al.
(1963) noted an increase in the cortisol levels of dental patients who were awaiting an extraction
and Mason et al. (1973) suggested that individuals anticipating exhaustive exercise also
produced higher levels of salivary cortisol than during the exercise itself. Of course, all
participants were aware that they were coming to Hunter College to participate in a gambling
study, which may have led them to begin thinking about tasks prior to the experiment.
Regardless of whether the participant felt eager to participate, HPA axis activation may have
occurred from this anticipatory effect.
Prior research outside the field of gambling has shown that low levels of
control/predictability contribute to an increased production of cortisol. On the surface, the data
presented in this study do not appear to be in agreement with this literature. However, several
experimental factors must be considered with these data. Firstly, gamblers, are thrill seekers,
seeking arousal from elements of unpredictability and low levels of controllability. Although
many gamblers sustain the illusion of control, at a certain level they remain aware that their
wager might result in a loss. The cumulative effects of i) the gambler’s excitement linked to a
personal association with a wager, ii) the potential pride in winning a wager of illusionary skill,
and iii) the inevitable thoughts that the wager may result in a loss are thought to lead to increased
cortisol production among gamblers. While the illusion of control at first seems to inflate the
gambler’s confidence, I assert that this inflation masks the true sensations of unpredictability and
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low levels of controllability that the gambler experiences, resulting in increased levels of
cortisol.
Gamblers actively visit casinos, racetracks, or betting parlors on their own. They also
expect to experience feelings of reward and pleasure prior to the gambling session in the form of
either optimistic dreams of winning money or simply enjoying the gambling activity itself.
Therefore, when the illusion of control is present within a framework of expectant pleasure,
salivary cortisol measurements must be carefully interpreted to determine exactly what they
represent.
Prior to this experiment, no research focused on salivary cortisol and gambling had
addressed the illusion of control as a mediating factor to an increase in HPA axis activity. This
study supports the theory that gamblers demonstrate increased levels of salivary cortisol in
context-specific settings, most likely when they are able to choose their own wager (i.e. control
their own destiny) rather than when the wager is assigned or randomized. This study could
influence the treatment methods for problem gambling by focusing treatment on games that the
gambler most frequently plays and by assessing the level of illusion of control that underlies
each of the wagers in those games.

BART Task: Perseverative Chasing
Aim 4: To investigate risk-taking behavior and perseverative chasing between two groups,
gamblers and nongamblers, by utilizing the Balloon Analogue Risk Task. The expected finding is
that pathological gamblers will show higher levels of risk-taking and a greater extent of
perseverative chasing than nongamblers.
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Introduction
In order to assess differences in levels of perseverative chasing and risk-taking between
gamblers and nongamblers, I chose to use the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) because it is
a measure of risk-taking and perseverative chasing that is related to the illusion of control
discussed in the previous study. The BART was designed to evaluate levels of risk preferences
by analyzing the choices made in a game-style scenario, which also incorporates the element of
fun into the task. Participants inflate computerized balloons, one at a time, by clicking on the
mouse provided. The goal of the task is to inflate each balloon to its maximum level of inflation,
but not more, otherwise the balloon will burst. Each successful pump of the balloon is worth a
specific amount of money, typically five cents. If the balloon is inflated past the individual
threshold (explosion point) it will pop and the participant will lose all the money accrued for that
particular trial. The participant is made aware that he/she may “cash out” at any given time, that
each balloon is independent of the balloons inflated in previous trials, and that each balloon has
its own unique threshold and can pop at any random moment (Lejuez et al., 2002). In order to
keep the money in the temporary bank, participants must decide to collect their earnings on each
individual balloon trial, before the balloon bursts. Doing this ends that particular balloon trial and
transfers the money into a permanent bank (Lejuez et al., 2002).
This task measures risk-taking behavior. Lejuez et al. (2002) hypothesized that gamblers
will inflate the balloon more frequently that nongamblers and that the amount of clicks may
diminish depending on the results of the previous balloon’s trial. For example, if balloon 5 burst
after only six inflations (clicks of the mouse), nongamblers would tend to be more cautious about
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their number of inflations on the next balloon (balloon 6). Gamblers, however, would elicit the
opposite behavior and attempt to chase their losses by inflating the balloon to its maximum
potential, therefore showing riskier behavior.
Lejuez et al. (2002) illustrated that levels of riskiness on the BART was significantly
correlated with scores on self-report measures of risk-taking questionnaires and self-reported
occurrence of real-world risk taking. Lejuez et al. (2003) used the BART as an instrument to
determine if there were significant differences in risk-taking measures between cigarette smokers
and non-smokers and found that smokers scored higher. The BART is a reliable experimental
tool for measuring risk-taking because it rewards riskiness up until the point that further riskiness
results in poor outcomes or loss of gained earnings. This is difficult to achieve in a laboratorybased gambling paradigm and is a key factor of experimental paradigm design that the Iowa
Gambling Task and other experimental gambling paradigms lack.
Mishra et al. (2011) used the BART in conjunction with several self-reported personality
trait questionnaires, self-reported attitude towards risk questionnaires, and other laboratory
behavioral measures of risk. Data indicated that behavioral performance on the BART was
correlated with gambling involvement, and that gambling involvement is a predictor of general
risk-taking.
Additionally, previous research has suggested that a correlation exists between BART
scores and substance use in both community and clinical samples (Bornovalova et al., 2005).
Scores on the BART have also been suggested to be highly correlated with risky sexual
behaviors (Lejuez et al., 2004).
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At its core, the BART is a measure of not only risk-taking behavior, but also impulsivity
and perseverative chasing, which have been established as subcategories that heighten the
potential for risk-taking behavior. Impulsivity can be measured by analyzing the total number of
inflations per balloon. Risk-taking behavior is associated with a greater mean number of
inflations across all 30 trials in which a balloon did not burst. Perseverative chasing can be
measured by analyzing the number of inflations immediately following a balloon that had burst
and comparing those data to the mean number of inflations when the balloon did not burst. A
participant exhibits perseverative chasing if the mean number of inflations following a burst
balloon, across all trials, is greater than the mean number of inflations of all balloons that did not
burst (Lejuez et al., 2002). We believe that gamblers will demonstrate a greater level of risktaking behavior than nongamblers and will perseveratively chase to a greater extent than
nongamblers. The present study is novel because, to our knowledge, no study has used the
BART as a measure of both risk-taking and perseverative chasing simultaneously using a
population of problem and nonproblem gamblers.

Methods
Participants
The 36 participants (20 nongamblers and 16 gamblers), aged between 18 and 30 (mean
25.7 years), were recruited through my personal and professional networks. The gamblers
recruited all worked for the same company [ILT Associates, LLC], and each of these participants
met the criteria for gambler classification. Of the 45 respondents that originally stated that they
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would be willing to participate, nine did not show up to their scheduled appointment at CUNY
Hunter College. All participants had completed a four-year college education.

Materials
The materials used in the experimental session were self-report questionnaires that asked
about participants’ gambling history (SOGS and Lie/Bet Scale, previously mentioned) as well as
the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). The BART was conducted in a 12 ft. × 12 ft.
experimental cubicle including a desk supporting an Apple computer, a 13-inch color monitor,
and a mouse. The experimenters were seated in a cubicle next to the participant, but out of the
participant’s sight. In order to minimize order effects, the BART was administered
intermittently between the administration of the SOGS and Lie/Bet scale.
Each participant was told that each time the balloon inflated without exploding, he/she
would earn $.05 of “points” and that he/she could “cash out” the earnings for any single balloon
whenever he/she desired. The participant with the highest total earnings of “points” after 30
trials would be rewarded with a $50 gift card to www.amazon.com. This incentive provided true
motivation and competition for participants and thus improved the reliability of the gathered
data. None of the participants was told the current “high score” prior to participation and thus
that they had no specific point amount to attempt to reach; thus, the threshold was completely up
to the individual participant. During the task, the computer monitor illustrated a simulated red
balloon, which was accompanied by a pump, a button labeled “Collect $$$”, a permanent money
earned display, as well as another display labeled “Potential Earnings” and a third that identified
what numerical trial the balloon at hand reflected. Once a balloon was pumped past the
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individual explosion point, a popping sound was released and all of the earnings in the Potential
Earnings bank was reset to zero and the participant was forced to the next balloon trial. When the
participant clicked on the “Collect $$$” button, a ringing sound emulating a slot machine payout
was emitted, and the points from the Potential Earnings were transferred into the permanent
bank. After explosion or collection of points, the participant’s exposure to that trial ended, he
was introduced to a new balloon trial (30 trials total). While the participant was aware that each
balloon could get quite large and would pop at random points, he was not told that the weakest
balloon had the potential to burst on the very first pump, and the strongest balloon would
explode after 128 pumps. Thus the theoretical average number of pumps per trial before
explosion was pre-programmed to 64 (Lejuez et al., 2002).
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Figure 7. BART Task: Image of Trial 1, Initial Balloon Size. Balloon always appears this size at
the start of each trial. Potential earnings, balloon number, number of pumps, and total winnings
are always indicated on the right-hand side.
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Figure 8. BART Task: Image of Sample Trial 5, Balloon Intact. Balloon size enlarges as
participant clicks the button to “Pump up the balloon.” This participant has $3.70* points in their
permanent bank. This participant currently has the option of transferring $2.80* points into their
permanent bank by clicking the “Collect $$$” button or continuing to “Pump up the balloon”
with the hope that it will not burst.
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Figure 9. BART Task: Image of Popped Balloon. Balloon burst on trial 1 and participant loses
$2.30* points of potential earnings that will not be transferred into the permanent bank.
Results

A series of descriptive statistics were conducted on these data in order to determine the
mean number of inflations on the basis of gambler status separately on the basis of trial number.
Figure 10 summarizes these descriptive statistics focusing specifically on the first ten trials. In all
10 cases, it was found that gamblers had a substantially larger number of mean inflations as
compared with non-gamblers. Additionally, the extent of the difference between gamblers and
non-gamblers was found to generally increase over time. To illustrate, in the initial trial, nongamblers had a mean of 17.500 inflations (SD = 20.051), with gamblers having a mean of 24.063
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(SD = 19.024). In the fifth trial, non-gamblers had a mean of 16.450 (SD = 11.989), with
gamblers having a mean of 38.625 inflations (SD = 29.727). In the 10th trial, non-gamblers had a
mean of 19.700 inflations (SD = 10.776), while gamblers had a mean of 45.938 (SD = 31.518.

Figure 10. Mean Number of Inflations by Gambler Status: First 10 Trials.

The pattern of gamblers having a substantially greater number of mean inflations as
compared with non-gamblers continued with respect to the 11th through the 20th trials. These
means are summarized in Figure 11. The extent of the differences between gamblers and non-
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gamblers with regard to these trials was similar to the size of the differences found among the
first 10 trials.

Figure 11. Mean Number of Inflations by Gambler Status: Middle 10 Trials.

Finally, Figure 12 presents the mean number of inflations separately on the basis of
gambler status for the final 10 trials included within this study. A similar pattern of differences
between gamblers and non-gamblers was indicated with respect to these final 10 trials.
Additionally, with regard to the average of all 30 trials, non-gamblers were found to have a mean
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of 19.417 inflations (SD = 7.880), with gamblers having a mean of 40.000 inflations (SD =
17.488). In sum, gamblers were found to have a greater number of inflations in every trial.
Additionally, standard deviations were found to be high, indicating a large degree of variation in
these data. The full set of descriptive statistics calculated are reported Table 2.1 in Appendix 2.

Figure 12. Mean Number of Inflations by Gambler Status: Final 10 Trials.
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A series of independent-samples t-tests conducted on these data tested whether
significant differences in the mean number of inflations exist on the basis of gambler status.
Differences were indicated with respect to the following trials: 3-10, 12-14, 16-26, 28-30; p < .05
in all cases. A difference was also indicated with respect to the average of all 30 trials, t(19.855)
= -4.367, p < .001. In all of these cases, gamblers were found to have a greater number of
inflations as compared with non-gamblers. The full set of statistics associated with these analyses
are reported in Table 2.2 in Appendix 2.
Further independent-samples t-tests focused upon the mean number of inflations by
gambler status with trials grouped into the initial 10, the middle 10, and the final 10 trials.
Descriptive statistics conducted on these data indicated that with regard to each group, gamblers
had a substantially higher mean number of inflations as compared with non-gamblers. Among
the first 10 trials, gamblers were found to have a mean of 34.800 inflations (SD = 17.661), with
non-gamblers having a mean of 17.335 inflations (SD = 8.714). Next, among the middle 10
trials, gamblers were found to have a mean of 38.594 inflations (SD = 13.836), with nongamblers having a mean of 19.110 inflations (SD = 6.924). Finally, with regard to the final 10
trials, gamblers were found to have a mean of 46.606 inflations (SD = 25.473), with nongamblers having a mean of 21.805 inflations (SD = 11.870). These descriptive statistics are
summarized in Figure 13, and are fully reported in Table 2.3 in Appendix 2. Additionally,
standard deviations were found be moderately large with regard to these measures.

64

Figure 13. Mean Number of Inflations by Gambler Status: Grouped Trials.

Among the independent-samples t-tests conducted on these data, differences were found
in all three cases, including the first set of 10 trials, t(20.789) = -3.619, p < .01, the second set of
10 trials, t(20.949) = -5.141, p < .001, and finally, the final set of 10 trials, t(20.183) = -3.595, p
< .01. Among each group, gamblers were found to have a greater number of inflations as
compared with non-gamblers. The full results of these analyses are reported in Table 2.4 in
Appendix 2.
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Additional analyses were conducted focusing specifically upon the trial immediately
following a trial in which the balloon had burst. The descriptive statistics conducted on these
data found gamblers to have a substantially greater number of inflations as compared with nongamblers in every case. Additionally, standard deviations associated with these measurements
were found to be moderately large, indicating a substantial degree of variation in these data.
With regard to the average of all 17 cases, here it was found that non-gamblers had a mean of
16.506 inflations (SD = 7.941), with gamblers having a mean of 43.637 inflations (SD = 24.509).
The full set of descriptives conducted on these data are reported in Table 2.5 in Appendix 2.
Among the independent-samples t-tests conducted on these data, differences were
indicated with regard to the first through sixth instances of balloons popping: Case 1: t(18.839) =
-3.173, p < .01; Case 2: t(19.618) = -2.353, p < .05; Case 3: t(17.589) = -3.732, p < .01; Case 4:
t(18.317) = -3.559, p < .01; Case 5: t(20.319) = -3.093, p < .01. Following this, the later
instances did not indicate differences, most likely due to the fact that sample sizes became very
small, reducing statistical power. Additionally, differences were also indicated with regard to the
mean of all cases, t(17.655) = -4.244, p < .01. In all instances where significance was found,
gamblers were found to have a greater number of inflations as compared with non-gamblers. The
full set of results associated with these analyses are reported in Table 2.6 in Appendix 2.

Discussion

66
As presented here, scores on the BART were predictors of risk-taking behavior in a
laboratory-based gambling paradigm. The data suggest that gamblers showed riskier levels of
behavior than their non-gambler counterparts by inflating the balloon at a higher threshold before
deciding to collect the earnings for that balloon. In addition to enhancing previous research that
deals with impulsivity and risky decision-making, results of this experiment also suggest that
gamblers showed a higher level of perseverative chasing than nongamblers. That is, when any
given balloon did burst within the set, gamblers attempted to chase their losses by
overcompensating for the fact that they did not earn points on that trial, by increasing the number
of pumps on the subsequent trial, as compared to their adjusted number of average pumps. It is
noteworthy that gamblers showed higher levels of perseverative chasing in the first through sixth
instances of balloons popping, which may indicate higher levels of initial impulsivity than
nongamblers during a novel task. These findings support the initial working hypothesis.
The results of the present study support the findings of Lejuez et al. (2002). As
hypothesized, gamblers demonstrated greater levels of risk-taking and perseverative chasing than
nongamblers. This can be interpreted to mean that perseverative chasing is an important
determinant of risk-taking behavior. Further experimental design will determine the extent to
which risk-taking and perseverative chasing are related to one another.
Rao et al. (2008) used a modified version of the BART in fMRI research to determine the
neural correlates of voluntary and involuntary risk taking in the human brain. Risk-taking is
commonly thought of as an exclusively voluntary action, but some forms of risk occur through
involuntary means. Traditional administration of the BART provides participants with the option
of continuing to inflate the balloon or to quit inflating at any point within a trial. Rao et al.
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(2008) administered the BART in two modes: active and passive. The active session utilized the
traditional application of the BART and participants were permitted to stop inflating the balloon
at any point that they wanted. However, the passive session used computer-generated inflations
of the balloon and the participant had no influence over if and when the balloon ceased to inflate
(Rao et al., 2008). These two sessions facilitated the investigation of neural substrates that
underlie active versus passive risk-taking.
In both paradigms, risk taking was correlated with activity in the bilateral visual pathway
areas. During the active paradigm there was activation in the VTA, striatum, insula, ACC and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex which suggests that DA-rich frontal regions affect active risktaking. These areas were not observed actively during the passive session, which suggests that
voluntary risk-taking facilitates the recruitment of these frontal regions rather than risk-taking
itself (Rao et al., 2008).
One major limitation of the present study is that there was no behavioral measurement of
passive risk-taking. In a real-life setting, many forms of gambling only require passive risktaking where no active decisions have to be made by the gambler that affect the outcome (slot
machines, keno, lottery drawings). While the SOGS and Lie/Bet Scale were used to determine
gambling status, no consideration was taken to determine if the preferred methods of gambling
required active or passive risk-taking.
It is also interesting to note that the mean difference between totals pumps made by
gamblers and nongamblers became consistently larger when we compare the first ten trials
(-174.650), middle ten trials (-194.838), and final ten trials (-248.013). This finding suggests that
there was less of a disparity in terms of risk taking between gamblers and nongamblers for the
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fist ten trials. As the paradigm evolved and gamblers gained confidence and learned theoretical
threshold, risk-taking and perseverative chasing increased. This was an expected finding as
Leiserson and Pihl (2007) determined that gamblers show a greater extent of perseverative
chasing than nongamblers. These results suggest that the BART may be a useful assessment of
risk-taking behavior and more specifically, levels of perseverative chasing that may be
implemented in a process that attempts to identify individuals in need of intervention.
Since the balloon is programmed to explode anywhere between 1-128 inflations, the
balloon should theoretically explode after an average of 64 inflations. The mean number of
inflations is significantly lower than the expected average for this paradigm, even among
gamblers and risk takers (Lejuex et al., 2002). One possible explanation for this surprising
consistency in the literature is that the participants’ instructions for the paradigm are
intentionally ambiguous and they are not given any indication of the upper threshold of the
balloon’s inflation potential. If participants were accurately informed about the upper threshold, I
hypothesize that gamblers and risk takers would inflate the balloon, on average, higher than 64
times.

Conclusions
While it has been clearly established in the literature that gamblers often have an illusion
of control while in the act of gambling, all of the dependent measured used to measure the
illusion have been behavioral. These behavioral measures have included ratings of perceived
control (Langer and Roth, 1975), confidence levels (Langer, 1975), bet size (Dunn and Wilson,
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1990), bet difficulty (Davis et al., 2000), and perceived odds of winning (Wohl and Enzle, 2002).
To our knowledge, the research presented in Specific Aims 1, 2, and 3 is the first of its kind that
uses a specific biomarker (salivary cortisol) to measure illusion of control within a gamblingcentered paradigm. The finding that levels of salivary cortisol only differed between gamblers
and nongamblers during the flexible condition supports the notion that gamblers are susceptible
to the illusion of control more so than nongamblers, as this was the only condition within the
paradigm that allowed gamblers to place their own wagers as opposed to simply being exposed
to a horserace or being assigned a horse by an experimenter.
In addition, the data presented in relation to Specific Aim 4 provides further evidence that
gamblers are susceptible to perseverative chasing, and engaged in riskier behavior within a
simple balloon inflation task. One especially noteworthy finding is that although significant
differences between gamblers and nongamblers was found with nearly all of the thirty trials,
there was no significant difference in trial one or two. We can conclude that the initial threshold
of risk-taking behavior did not differ between the two groups, as the threshold had not yet been
determined. Thus, gamblers will rely on past experience to mold their future behaviors, which
may facilitate risk taking and perseverative chasing.
I suggest that perseverative chasing is also facilitated by an illusion of control and a
desire to participate in active risk-taking. In our initial study, differences in salivary cortisol
between gamblers and nongamblers were only significant for the flexible condition, the only
active risk-taking paradigm in the study. This illustrates the significance of an individual’s
connection to “control” over a wager and activation of the HPA-axis. In the following study that
measured behavioral risk-taking, gamblers showed higher levels of both risk-taking and
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perseverative chasing. I argue that the illusion of control is somewhat of a façade that masks the
gambler’s own doubts about the potential risk they have taken. If and when the gambler incurs a
loss, he will perseveratively chase in order to recoup the monies and thus, perseverative chasing
will restart the vicious cycle of illusionary thoughts affecting levels of confidence and
excitability. Salivary cortisol levels and behavioral data suggest that even the gambler is truly
stimulated when and only when actively risk-taking.
In the future, I hope to use salivary cortisol as a biomarker to measure the role of
anticipation of reward on the HPA axis, and, inadvertently, how length of anticipation of reward
may or may not influence the illusion of control, levels of risk-taking behavior and perseverative
chasing. I also hope to further investigate the illusion of control and its role in passive risk-taking
since our findings suggest that illusion of control and perseverative chasing are strongly related
to active risk-taking among problem gamblers.
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Table 1.1

Difference in Cortisol Levels by Condition: Paired-Samples t-Tests
Measure

Mean Diff.

SD Diff.

t

df

p

Full Sample
Exposure

.100

.198

3.875

58

<.001

Exposure +10

.129

.268

3.723

59

<.001

Assigned

.083

.196

3.273

59

.002

Assigned +10

.113

.199

4.366

58

<.001

Flexible

.079

.292

2.102

59

.040

Flexible +10

.099

.278

2.769

59

.008

Exposure

.108

.224

3.003

38

.005

Exposure +10

.148

.285

3.290

39

.002

Assigned

.085

.215

2.409

39

.017

Assigned +10

.121

.208

3.675

39

.001

Flexible

.138

.287

3.043

39

.004

Flexible +10

.158

.282

3.548

39

.001

Gamblers
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Nongamblers
Exposure

.084

.136

2.763

19

.012

Exposure +10

.091

.235

1.732

19

.099

Assigned

.079

.157

2.265

19

.035

Assigned +10

.097

.183

2.306

18

.033

Flexible

-.038

.273

-.628

19

.537

Flexible +10

-.019

.232

-.362

19

.721
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Table 1.2

Difference in Cortisol Levels by Gambling Status: Descriptives
Measure
Baseline (ug/dL)

Exposure (ug/dL)

Exposure + 10 (ug/dL)

Assigned (ug/dL)

Assigned + 10 (ug/dL)

Flexible (ug/dL)

Flexible + 10 (ug/dL)

Gambler

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

No

40

0.386

0.405

Yes

20

0.381

0.223

No

41

0.259

0.231

Yes

21

0.295

0.231

No

42

0.236

0.226

Yes

21

0.285

0.288

No

42

0.300

0.299

Yes

21

0.300

0.204

No

42

0.264

0.242

Yes

20

0.299

0.216

No

42

0.245

0.199

Yes

21

0.416

0.365

No

42

0.226

0.159

Yes

21

0.395

0.322
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Table 1.3

Difference in Cortisol Levels by Gambling Status: Independent-Samples t-Tests
Levene’s F

p

t

df

p

Mean Diff.

Baseline (ug/dL)

.683

.412

.055

58

.956

0.005

Exposure (ug/dL)

1.036

.313

-.593

60

.555

-0.037

Exposure + 10 (ug/dL) 2.196

.144

-.735

61

.465

-0.049

Assigned (ug/dL)

.085

.772

.003

61

.998

0.000

Assigned + 10 (ug/dL)

.041

.840

-.550

60

.584

-0.035

5.967

.017

-2.004

26.108

.056

-0.171

Flexible + 10 (ug/dL) 11.265

.001

-2.265

25.023

.032

-0.169

Measure

Flexible (ug/dL)
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Table 1.4

Difference in Cortisol Levels by Win/Loss: Flexibility: Descriptives
Measure

Win/Loss

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

W

15

0.284

0.132

L

45

0.418

0.396

W

17

0.225

0.133

L

45

0.288

0.256

Exposure + 10 (ug/dL) W

17

0.220

0.184

L

46

0.265

0.267

W

17

0.279

0.173

L

46

0.308

0.298

Assigned + 10 (ug/dL) W

17

0.243

0.125

L

45

0.287

0.262

W

17

0.252

0.169

L

46

0.320

0.304

Flexible + 10 (ug/dL) W

17

0.239

0.192

L

46

0.299

0.253

Baseline (ug/dL)

Exposure (ug/dL)

Assigned (ug/dL)

Flexible (ug/dL)
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Table 1.5

Difference in Cortisol Levels by Win/Loss: Flexibility: Independent-Samples t-Tests
Levene’s F

p

Baseline (ug/dL)

4.213

.045

-1.954

Exposure (ug/dL)

3.389

.071

Exposure + 10 (ug/dL) 1.548
Assigned (ug/dL)

Measure

t

df

p

Mean Diff.

57.979

.056

-0.133

-.965

60

.338

-0.063

.218

-.643

61

.522

-0.045

1.062

.307

-.378

61

.707

-0.029

Assigned + 10 (ug/dL) 4.497

.038

-.906

56.529

.369

-0.045

Flexible (ug/dL)

2.454

.122

-.878

61

.383

-0.069

Flexible + 10 (ug/dL)

1.586

.213

-.880

61

.382

-0.060
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Table 1.6

Difference in Cortisol Levels by Win/Loss: Assigned: Descriptives
Measure

Win/Loss

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

W

32

0.340

0.257

L

28

0.435

0.438

W

33

0.259

0.239

L

29

0.284

0.222

Exposure + 10 (ug/dL) W

33

0.224

0.187

L

30

0.285

0.299

W

33

0.255

0.186

L

30

0.349

0.335

Assigned + 10 (ug/dL) W

32

0.237

0.176

L

30

0.316

0.278

W

33

0.266

0.199

L

30

0.342

0.339

Flexible + 10 (ug/dL) W

33

0.257

0.225

L

30

0.311

0.252

Baseline (ug/dL)

Exposure (ug/dL)

Assigned (ug/dL)

Flexible (ug/dL)
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Table 1.7

Difference in Cortisol Levels by Win/Loss: Assigned: Independent-Samples t-Tests
Levene’s F

p

Baseline (ug/dL)

1.902

.173

Exposure (ug/dL)

.006

Measure

df

p

Mean Diff.

-1.038

58

.304

-0.095

.939

-.425

60

.673

-0.025

Exposure + 10 (ug/dL) 2.035

.159

-.977

61

.332

-0.061

Assigned (ug/dL)

4.195

.045

-1.349

44.355

.184

-0.093

Assigned + 10 (ug/dL) 5.172

.027

-1.340

48.540

.187

-0.080

Flexible (ug/dL)

2.420

.125

-1.098

61

.277

-0.076

.854

.359

-.904

61

.370

-0.054

Flexible + 10 (ug/dL)

t
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Table 1.8
GLM Model: Within-Subjects Effects
Source

Type III SS

df

MS

F

Sig.

Part. η2

NP

Power

Time
Sphericity Assumed .018

1

.018

6.295

.015

.101

6.295

.694

Greenhouse-Geisser .018

1.000

.018

6.295

.015

.101

6.295

.694

Huynh-Feldt

.018

1.000

.018

6.295

.015

.101

6.295

.694

Lower-bound

.018

1.000

.018

6.295

.015

.101

6.295

.694

Sphericity Assumed .001

1

.001

.448

.506

.008

.448

.101

Greenhouse-Geisser .001

1.000

.001

.448

.506

.008

.448

.101

Huynh-Feldt

.001

1.000

.001

.448

.506

.008

.448

.101

Lower-bound

.001

1.000

.001

.448

.506

.008

.448

.101

Time * Gambler

Error (Time)
Sphericity Assumed .160

56

.003

Greenhouse-Geisser .160

56.000

.003

Huynh-Feldt

.160

56.000

.003

Lower-bound

.160

56.000

.003
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Condition
Sphericity Assumed .696

3

.232

6.756

.000

.108

20.269

.974

Greenhouse-Geisser .696

1.603

.434

6.756

.004

.108

10.829

.859

Huynh-Feldt

.696

1.672

.416

6.756

.003

.108

11.298

.870

Lower-bound

.696

1.000

.696

6.756

.012

.108

6.756

.724

Sphericity Assumed .502

3

.167

4.873

.003

.080

14.620

.902

Greenhouse-Geisser .502

1.603

.313

4.873

.015

.080

7.811

.725

Huynh-Feldt

.502

1.672

.300

4.873

.014

.080

8.149

.738

Lower-bound

.502

1.000

.502

4.873

.031

.080

4.873

.583

Condition * Gambler

Error (Condition)
Sphericity Assumed 5.767 168

.034

Greenhouse-Geisser5.767

89.757

.064

Huynh-Feldt

5.767

93.643

.062

Lower-bound

5.767

56.000

.103

Time * Condition
Sphericity Assumed .009

3

.003

.760

.518

.013

2.281

.211

Greenhouse-Geisser .009

1.951

.005

.760

.467

.013

1.483

.175

Huynh-Feldt

2.056

.004

.760

.473

.013

1.563

.179

.009
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Lower-bound

.009

1.000

.009

.760

.387

.013

.760

.137

Sphericity Assumed .004

3

.001

.304

.823

.005

.911

.108

Greenhouse-Geisser .004

1.951

.002

.304

.733

.005

.592

.097

Huynh-Feldt

.004

2.056

.002

.304

.745

.005

.624

.098

Lower-bound

.004

1.000

.004

.304

.584

.005

.304

.084

Time * Condition * Gambler

Error (Time*Condition)
Sphericity Assumed .649 168

.004

Greenhouse-Geisser .649 109.240

.006

Huynh-Feldt

.649 115.153

.006

Lower-bound

.649

.012

56.000
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Table 1.9

Respondent Condition: Multiple Comparisons
Condition
Baseline

Exposure

Assigned

Flexible

Mean Diff.

SE

p

Exposure

.104

.030

.007

Assigned

.096

.027

.005

Flexible

.057

.038

.859

Baseline

-.104

.030

.007

Assigned

-.008

.014

1.000

Flexible

-.047

.019

.091

Baseline

-.096

.027

.005

Exposure

.008

.014

1.000

Flexible

-.040

.019

.228

Baseline

-.057

.038

.859

Exposure

.047

.019

.091

Assigned

.040

.019

.228
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Table 1.10

Full GLM Model: Between-Subjects Effects
Source

Type III SS df

MS

F

Sig.

Part. η2

NP

Power
Intercept

41.242

1

41.242

86.666

.000

.607

86.666

1.000

Gambler

.687

1

.687

1.443

.235

.025

1.443

.219

26.649

56

.476

Error
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Table 2.1
Independent-Samples t-Tests: Mean Inflations by Trial: Descriptives
Gambler
Gambler Status
N
Mean
Trial 1
No
20
17.500
Yes
16
24.063
Trial 2
No
20
15.700
Yes
16
24.250
Trial 3
No
20
17.000
Yes
16
30.000
Trial 4
No
20
17.500
Yes
16
35.000
Trial 5
No
20
16.450
Yes
16
38.625
Trial 6
No
20
15.950
Yes
16
32.000
Trial 7
No
20
17.600
Yes
16
42.625
Trial 8
No
20
17.850
Yes
16
39.438
Trial 9
No
20
18.100
Yes
16
36.063
Trial 10
No
20
19.700
Yes
16
45.938
Trial 11
No
20
15.200
Yes
16
31.938
Trial 12
No
20
18.200
Yes
16
41.625
Trial 13
No
20
19.200
Yes
16
35.250
Trial 14
No
20
19.150
Yes
16
38.938
Trial 15
No
20
19.050
Yes
16
30.750
Trial 16
No
20
18.650
Yes
16
35.375
Trial 17
No
20
20.150
Yes
16
42.938
Trial 18
No
20
20.500
Yes
16
42.063
Trial 19
No
20
20.550
Yes
16
38.313
Trial 20
No
20
20.450
Yes
16
48.750

Std. Deviation
20.051
19.024
10.058
19.042
13.038
15.051
12.369
22.663
11.989
29.727
6.565
22.613
8.178
29.051
7.177
25.838
11.401
26.055
10.776
31.518
9.070
30.968
11.560
30.535
8.276
24.201
10.742
23.020
10.719
21.977
11.550
20.152
11.385
25.549
7.931
31.556
8.432
22.665
10.380
28.885
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Trial 21
Trial 22
Trial 23
Trial 24
Trial 25
Trial 26
Trial 27
Trial 28
Trial 29
Trial 30
Trial Average

No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

20
16
20
16
20
16
20
16
20
16
20
16
20
16
20
16
20
16
20
16
20
16

19.800
46.563
19.150
50.875
18.150
43.813
20.200
40.500
24.050
56.000
21.300
55.063
23.850
33.188
24.750
51.938
24.200
41.688
22.600
46.438
19.417
40.000

11.804
30.863
13.048
30.115
12.500
26.372
11.994
31.507
13.578
46.562
15.958
35.309
15.425
24.884
16.140
42.675
17.139
29.534
18.103
40.813
7.880
17.488
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Table 2.2
Independent-Samples t-Tests: Mean Inflations by Trial
Measure
Levene’s F
p
t
Trial 1
.045
.833
-.998
Trial 2
4.887
.034
-1.624
Trial 3
2.714
.109
-2.776
Trial 4
9.278
.004
-2.776
Trial 5
10.467
.003
-2.807
Trial 6
20.954
<.001
-2.748
Trial 7
41.998
<.001
-3.341
Trial 8
19.118
<.001
-3.243
Trial 9
7.029
.012
-2.568
Trial 10
13.587
.001
-3.184
Trial 11
9.053
.005
-2.091
Trial 12
21.587
<.001
-2.906
Trial 13
10.098
.003
-2.537
Trial 14
10.768
.002
-3.173
Trial 15
8.162
.007
-1.952
Trial 16
5.563
.024
-2.954
Trial 17
11.261
.002
-3.314
Trial 18
13.457
.001
-2.667
Trial 19
4.761
.036
-2.974
Trial 20
6.361
.017
-3.731
Trial 21
10.488
.003
-3.282
Trial 22
4.007
.053
-4.250
Trial 23
6.013
.019
-3.584
Trial 24
7.632
.009
-2.440
Trial 25
9.367
.004
-2.656
Trial 26
7.583
.009
-3.546
Trial 27
1.518
.226
-1.381
Trial 28
15.461
<.001
-2.414
Trial 29
1.709
.200
-2.225
Trial 30
7.783
.009
-2.172

df
p
34
.325
21.594 .119
34
.009
22.014 .011
18.905 .011
17.030 .014
16.909 .004
16.858 .005
19.585 .019
17.813 .005
17.066 .052
18.446 .009
17.815 .021
20.198 .005
20.661 .065
22.683 .007
19.751 .004
16.521 .017
18.328 .008
18.107 .002
18.516 .004
34
<.001
20.357 .002
18.483 .025
17.048 .017
19.883 .002
34
.176
18.439 .026
34
.033
19.708 .042

Mean Diff.
-6.563
-8.550
-13.000
-17.500
-22.175
-16.050
-25.025
-21.588
-17.963
-26.238
-16.738
-23.425
-16.050
-19.788
-11.700
-16.725
-22.788
-21.563
-17.763
-28.300
-26.763
-31.725
-25.663
-20.300
-31.950
-33.763
-9.338
-27.188
-17.488
-23.838

Trial Average

19.855 <.001

-20.583

8.198

.007

-4.367
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Table 2.3
Independent-Samples t-Tests: Mean Inflations by Trial, Three Categories: Descriptives
Gambler
Gambler Status
N
Mean
Std. Deviation
Trials: First 10
No
20
17.335
8.714
Yes
16
34.800
17.661
Trial: Middle 10
No
20
19.110
6.924
Yes
16
38.594
13.836
Trial: Last 10
No
20
21.805
11.870
Yes
16
46.606
25.473
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Table 2.4
Independent-Samples t-Tests: Mean Inflations by Trial, Three Categories
Measure
Levene’s F
p
t
df
p
Trials: First 10
15.961
<.001
-3.619
20.789 .002
Trial: Middle 10
7.166
.011
-5.141
20.949 <.001
Trial: Last 10
4.818
.035
-3.595
20.183 .002

Mean Diff.
-17.465
-19.484
-24.801
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Table 2.5
Independent-Samples t-Tests: Trial after Balloon Burst: Descriptives
Gambler
Gambler Status
N
Mean
Case 1
No
19
15.632
Yes
16
31.625
Case 2
No
19
16.842
Yes
16
35.188
Case 3
No
18
15.667
Yes
16
42.125
Case 4
No
15
11.933
Yes
16
42.563
Case 5
No
14
21.000
Yes
16
51.188
Case 6
No
11
25.455
Yes
13
48.462
Case 7
No
6
20.833
Yes
9
37.000
Case 8
No
4
26.750
Yes
7
46.286
Case 9
No
4
31.000
Yes
6
60.833
Case 10
No
2
21.000
Yes
5
67.200
Case 11
No
2
45.000
Yes
4
54.750
Case 12
No
0
Yes
4
60.250
Case 13
No
0
Yes
2
84.500
Case 14
No
0
Yes
2
38.500
Case 15
No
0
Yes
1
98.000
Case 16
No
0
Yes
1
22.000
Case 17
No
0
Yes
1
120.000
Average of all Cases
No
19
16.506
Yes
16
43.637

Std. Deviation
7.410
18.980
12.451
29.020
8.485
27.210
10.600
32.635
14.502
35.835
11.219
35.827
14.525
37.125
18.062
34.505
16.753
34.225
12.728
50.047
21.213
22.882
60.080
50.205
2.121

7.941
24.509
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Table 2.6
Independent-Samples t-Tests: Trial after Balloon Burst
Measure
Levene’s F
p
t
Case 1
26.386
<.001
-3.173
Case 2
5.322
.027
-2.353
Case 3
30.297
<.001
-3.732
Case 4
12.219
.002
-3.559
Case 5
18.588
<.001
-3.093
Case 6
8.949
.007
-2.192
Case 7
2.926
.111
-1.006
Case 8
1.393
.268
-1.038
Case 9
.741
.415
-1.597
Case 10
1.650
.255
-1.224
Case 11
.020
.894
-.501
Average of all Cases 14.070
.001
-4.244

df
18.839
19.618
17.589
18.317
20.319
14.706
13
9
8
5
4
17.655

p
.005
.029
.002
.002
.006
.045
.333
.327
.149
.276
.643
.001

Mean Diff.
-15.993
-18.345
-26.458
-30.629
-30.188
-23.007
-16.167
-19.536
-29.833
-46.200
-9.750
-27.131
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Questionnaires

Questionnaire 1: SOUTH OAKS GAMBLING SCREEN (SOGS)
1.

Please indicate which of the following types of gambling you have done in your lifetime.
For each type, √ check one answer: not at all, less than once a week, or once week or more.
Not
At
All

Age
Activity
Began

Less
Than
Once
A
Week

Once
A
Week
Or
More

a. Play cards for money
b. Bet on horses, dogs, or other animals
c. Bet on sports (including Jai Alai)
d. Play dice games for money
e. Casino (legal or otherwise)
f. Play numbers, lottery or keno
g. Played bingo and/or pickles
h. Played the stock and/or commodities market
i. Played slots, poker, or other machines
j. Bowled, shot pool, played golf, or some other game of
skill, for money
2.

What is the largest amount of money you have ever gambled with on any 1 day?
□ Never have gambled
□ Between $101 - $1,000
□ $1 or less
□ From $1,001 - $10,000
□ More than $1 up to $10
□ More than $10,000
□ More than $10 up to $100

3.

Do (did) your parents have a gambling problem?
□ Both my father and mother gamble(d) too much
much
□ My mother gambles (or gambled) too much
much

□ My father gambles (or gambled) too
□ Neither one gambles/gambled too

4. When you gamble, how often do you go back another day to win back money you lost?
□ Never
□ Most of the times I lost
□ Some of the time (less than half the times I lost) □ Every time I lost
5. Have you ever claimed to be winning money gambling, but weren’t really. In fact, you lost?
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□ Never (or never gamble)
time

□ Yes, less than half the times I lost

□ Yes, most of the

6. Do you feel you have ever had a problem with gambling?
□ No
□ Yes, in the past, but not now
□ Yes
7.

Did you ever gamble more than you intended to?

□ Yes □ No

SOUTH OAKS GAMBLING SCREEN (SOGS) – Continued
8.

Have people criticized your gambling?

□ Yes

□ No

9.

Have you ever felt guilty about the way you gamble or what happens when you gamble?
□ Yes
□ No

10. Have you ever felt like you would like to stop gambling, but didn’t think you could?
□ Yes □ No
11. Have you ever hidden betting slips, lottery tickets, gambling money, or other signs of
gambling
from your spouse, children, or other important people in your life? □ Yes □ No
12. Have you ever argued with people you live with over how you handle money? □ Yes
No

□

13. If you have answered yes to question 12, have money arguments ever center on your
gambling?
□ Yes □ No
14. Have you ever borrowed from someone and not paid them back as a result of your
gambling?
□ Yes □ No
15. Have you ever lost time from work or school due to gambling? □ Yes

□ No

16. If you borrowed money to gamble or to pay gambling debts, who or where did you borrow
from?
(Check all that apply)
a. From household…………………………………………………………□ Yes

□ No

b. From spouse……………………………………………………………..□ Yes

□ No
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c. From other relatives or in-laws…………………………………………□ Yes

□ No

d. From banks, loan companies, or credit unions……………………….□ Yes

□ No

e. From credit cards………………………………………………………..□ Yes

□ No

f. From loan sharks (“shylocks”)………………………………………….□ Yes

□ No

g. You cashed in stocks, bonds, other securities……………………….□ Yes

□ No

h. You sold personal or family property………………………………….□ Yes

□ No

i. You passed bad checks………………………………………………...□ Yes

□ No

j. You have (had) a credit line with a bookie……………………………□ Yes

□ No

k. You have (had) a credit line with a casino……………………………□ Yes

□ No
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Questionnaire 2: Lie/Bet:

Lie/Bet Questionnaire:
1. Have you ever had to lie to people important to you about how much you gambled?
2. Have you ever felt the need to bet more and more money?
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Questionnaire 3:

Desirability of Control Scale

Below you will find a series of statements. Please read each statement carefully and respond to it
by expressing the extent to which you believe the statement applies to you. For all items, a
response from 1 to 7 is required. Use the number that best reflects your belief when the scale is
defined as follows:
1 = The statement does not apply to me at all
2 = The statement usually does not apply to me
3 = Most often, the statement does not apply
4 = I am unsure about whether or not the statement applies to me,
or it applies to me about half the time
5 = The statement applies more often than not
6 = The statement usually applies to me
7 = The statement always applies to me

1. I prefer a job where I have a lot of control
over what I do and when I do it.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2. I enjoy political participation because I
want to have as much of a say in running
government as possible.

3. I try to avoid situations where someone else
tells me what to do.

4. I would prefer to be a leader than a follower.

5. I enjoy being able to influence the actions of others.

6. I am careful to check everything on an
automobile before I leave for a long trip.

7. Others usually know what is best for me.
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8. I enjoy making my own decisions.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9. I enjoy having control over my own destiny.

10. I would rather someone else take over the leadership
role when I’m involved in a group project.

11. I consider myself to be generally more
capable of handling situations than others are.
12. I’d rather run my own business and make my
own mistakes than listen to someone else’s orders.

13. I like to get a good idea of what a job is all about
before I begin.

14. When I see a problem, I prefer to do something
about it rather than sit by and let it continue.

15. When it comes to orders, I would rather give
them than receive them.
16. I wish I could push many of life’s daily decisions
off on someone else.

17. When driving, I try to avoid putting myself in a
situation where I could be hurt by another
person’s mistake.

18. I prefer to avoid situations where someone
else has to tell me what it is I should be doing.
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19. There are many situations in which I would
prefer only one choice rather than having to
make a decision.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

20. I like to wait and see if someone else is going
to solve a problem so that I don’t have to be
bothered with it.
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Desirability of Control Scale
Scoring and Norms

To score:
1. Reverse answer values for items 7, 10, 16, 19 & 20.
(1 = 7, 2 = 6, 3 = 5, 4 = 4, 5 = 3, 2 = 6, 7 = 1)

2. Add all 20 answer values together.
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Questionnaire 4 : Research Questionnaire- Standard Demographic Information
1. In what year were you born? ________

2. What is your race/ethnicity? (Select all that apply)
a. White, non-Hispanic
b. African American or Black
c. Hispanic
d. Asian
e. American Indian or Alaska Native
f. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
g. Other___________________

3. What is your marital status?
a. Married
b. Divorced
c. Widowed
d. Separated
e. Never married

4. If divorced, widowed, separated, or never married, what is your relationship status?
a. In a committed relationship, not living together
b. In a committed relationship, living together
c. In a “complicated” relationship
d. Not in a relationship but dating
e. Not in a relationship and not dating

5. What is your sexual orientation?
a. heterosexual
b. homosexual
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c. bisexual
d. prefer not to say
e. other____________

6. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently
enrolled, mark the previous grade or highest degree received.
a. Less than high school
b. High school/GED
c. Some college
d. 2-year college degree (Associates)
e. 4-year college degree (BA, BS)
f. Master’s degree (MA, MFA, MS, MBA)
g. Doctoral degree (PhD)
h. Professional degree (MD, JD)

7. What is your approximate annual pre-tax income?

8. What is your household’s approximate total annual pre-tax income?

9. Employment status: Are you currently…?
a. Employed for wages/salary full-time
b. Employed for wages/salary part-time
c. Self-employed
d. Out of work and looking for work
e. Out of work but not currently looking for work
f. A homemaker
g. A student
h. Retired
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i. Unable to work/disabled

10. What is your occupation?

11. What is your current religious affiliation?
a. Protestant Christian
b. Catholic
c. Evangelical Christian
d. Jewish
e. Muslim
f. Hindu
g. Buddhist
h. None
i. Other______________________

12. Were you raised...?
a. Protestant Christian
b. Catholic
c. Evangelical Christian
d. Jewish
e. Muslim
f. Hindu
g. Buddhist
h. None
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i. Other______________________

13. What is your country of birth?

14. What is your city and state of residence?

15. How would you characterize your place of residence?
a. urban
b. rural
c. suburban

Please list all medications that you are currently taking:
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